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1. Introduction 
1.1 Subject of the Thesis 
The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1992 has often been seen as a watershed in the work of 
placing environmental and developmental issues on the international 
agenda. One hundred eighteen heads of governments came together to 
negotiate on and sign a number of declarations and conventions. More-
over, the ‘sustainable development’ was cemented as a concept, in order 
to solve the longstanding discussion on linking environmental and devel-
opmental problems. Agenda 21 was the main document adopted by the 
states, which was considered as an action plan for sustainable develop-
ment.  
In order to follow up the commitments from Rio, as well as to enhance 
the integration of environmental, economic and social dimensions of sus-
tainable development at the national, regional and international levels, 
UNCED decided to establish a Commission on Sustainable Development 
(CSD) within the United Nation’s Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). Thus, Agenda 21 called on the establishment of the CSD in 
chapter 38 (UN 1992). A Special Session of ECOSOC in 1993 agreed on 
the CSD’s mandate and main functions to; monitor and review progress 
on the implementation of Agenda 21 at local, national and international 
level; develop policy recommendations; and promote dialogue and build 
partnerships for sustainable development between governments, the 
international community, and major groups (Chasek 2000: 383ff; UN 
1993a). 
The establishment of the CSD was seen as one of the main outcomes of 
UNCED, as it was agreed that the follow-up activities would be of vital 
importance for sustainable development. However, there has been a 
growing concern if the CSD has succeeded in fulfilling its mandate and 
further advanced the sustainable development agenda (Chasek 2000: 
379). Some observers have even argued that the CSD is a ‘talk shop’ and 
a waste of time and money (Brown 1998: 5). A question that should be 
answered then, is whether this criticism is well-founded or not. Thus, the 
main objective for this study will be to evaluate the CSD’s accomplish-
ments during its first ten years. Moreover, it will be important to explain 
which mechanisms that affect the work of the CSD, in order to 
understand how it would be possible to enhance the Commission’s poten-
tial for effectiveness.  
1.2 Research Questions 
Scholars often distinguish between three types of institutional conse-
quences; output, outcome and impact (Easton 1965: 351f). When an 
agreement is made and an institution is established, this will lead to 
consequences such as the norms, principles, and rules generated by the 
institution itself, that is, the output. Further, when an agreement is imple-
mented, it is expected that this will lead to consequences in form of 
behavioural changes, which is regarded as the outcome of the agreement. 
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Finally, when measures are in effect and target groups are adjusted, this 
may in turn affect the physical problem at hand, that is, the impact of the 
agreement (Andresen and Skjærseth 1999: 4; Underdal 1998: 26; 
Underdal 2002: 7).  
An institution’s effectiveness is most often measured and determined by 
evaluating the outcome and impact. Preferably, a study of effectiveness 
should concern the ecological effects of an institution (i.e. impact), but 
such a study is seen as extremely difficult due to methodological 
problems. Thus, most studies are concerned with the outcome (Underdal 
2002: 6f). However, in order to study the outcome, the consequences of 
an institution must be evaluated several years after the institution’s entry 
into force (Underdal 1992: 230). As the CSD can be considered an im-
mature institution, it is probably too early to determine possible behav-
ioural change of target groups. Thus, I will base my study of the CSD on 
data about the output, in order to indicate its potential for effectiveness.  
‘The CSD’ accomplishments’, which refers to the rules, programs, means 
and efforts (i.e. the output) that have been decided upon by states, will be 
regarded as my dependent variable. In order to measure the score of the 
dependent variable, the first part of my analysis will focus on evaluating 
the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments compared to the goals 
formulated by its mandate. The second part of the analysis will explore 
which mechanisms explain the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments. 
My thesis for the study of the Commission on Sustainable Development 
consists therefore of two research questions: 
1. To what degree has the CSD achieved its goals? 
2. Which mechanisms explain the degree of the CSD’s accomplish-
ments?   
The first part of the thesis is descriptive, while the second part is explan-
atory. My intention will be, first, to evaluate to what degree the CSD has 
succeeded in fulfilling its mandate, and then, to use theory in order to 
explain which mechanisms that affect the CSD and its accomplishments. 
1.3 Choice of Theoretical Framework 
My theoretical framework for the study of the CSD draws on regime 
theory generally, and regime effectiveness theory especially. Interest-
based regime theory has become the mainstream approach to analyze 
international institutions, and is used to explain how institutions facilitate 
cooperation between states by helping them to realize common interests 
(Hasenclever et al. 1997). Thus, I assume that regime theory will provide 
some fruitful analytical tools for this case study.  
A starting point for the study will be the two explanatory perspectives 
proposed by Underdal (2002: 13): ‘the character of the problem’ and 
‘problem-solving capacity’. In order to understand how it would be pos-
sible to enhance the CSD’s potential for effectiveness, it will be import-
ant to explain and determine which mechanisms that affects the CSD’s 
accomplishments. Thus, I assume that the ‘problem-solving capacity’ 
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perspective will be a useful approach for the analysis of the CSD. How-
ever, the problem-solving capacity of an institution can not be seen as 
independent from the problem(s) the institution is supposed to solve. The 
main point here is that a malign problem will affect the problem-solving 
capacity for an institution differently than a benign problem (Underdal 
2002: 14f). Therefore, I will define the character of the problem prior to 
the analysis, in order to understand the CSD’s potential for fulfilling its 
goals.  
Concerning the ‘problem-solving capacity’, three sets of explanatory var-
iables will be evaluated; ‘institutional design’, ‘distribution of capabili-
ties’; and ‘entrepreneurial leadership’. I assume that all of the independ-
ent variables will contribute to the explanation of the degree of the CSD’s 
accomplishments. The variables will be regarded as complementary, 
rather than incompatible. Thus, I will not only evaluate and determine 
how these variables can explain the achievements of the CSD separately, 
but also how they interact and work together. 
1.4 Limitations of the Study 
When deciding and explaining the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments, 
I have made some limitations of the study with regards to time and space. 
Concerning time, I will evaluate the period 1993-2001, from the first ses-
sion of the CSD to its tenth session. By making such a choice, I will 
neither evaluate the formation process of the CSD, nor the decision-
making process after the ten-year review of the CSD at the Johannesburg 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002. In my 
opinion a study of the formation process would be too comprehensive 
given the scope of this thesis, and an evaluation of the effects of the 
decision-making process after WSSD would be premature. 
I have also made some limitations regarding space. When I have chosen 
the explanatory variables of ‘institutional design’, ‘distribution of capa-
bilities’, and ‘entrepreneurial leadership’, I have at the same time also 
excluded other variables that may have been significant for the CSD. For 
the study of the CSD, I will mostly focus on the institution itself and its 
output. Hence, external factors, such as domestic politics, public interest, 
and linkage with other UN bodies or other organizations, will not be 
evaluated. Even though these factors might have provided interesting and 
significant explanations, I have chosen to exclude the factors in order to 
limit the study’s complexity.  
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
The next chapter will provide the theoretical approach and the method-
ology for the study of the CSD. First, I will give a general presentation of 
regime theory, and further, present the theoretical framework for evaluat-
ing the CSD’s accomplishments. I will also discuss some of the main 
challenges to apply theory for this study. Second, I will consider some of 
the methodological problems regarding the evaluation of a single case 
study, and give an account for a research strategy that may reduce these 
problems. In chapter 3, a presentation of the background history of the 
CSD will be given. Chapter 4 will give a brief description of the main 
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decisions made by the states during the period 1993-2001. In chapter 5, I 
will evaluate and determine the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments by 
comparing them with the CSD’s mandate. Based on my theoretical 
framework, I will evaluate which mechanisms explain the degree of the 
CSD’s performances in chapter 6. Finally, in chapter 7, I will sum up my 
findings, discuss the fruitfulness of the study and look at the future 
prospects for the CSD. 
2. Theory and Methodology 
The theoretical approach used for the study of the CSD will draw on 
mainstream regime theory generally, and regime effectiveness theory 
especially. First, the concepts of ‘regimes’ and ‘institutions’ will be spe-
cified and defined, as regime theory will be applied in the study of the 
CSD, which can be considered an institution. Then, I will give a general 
presentation of theory. Following this, I will discuss some of the chal-
lenges related to evaluating and measuring effectiveness, before I state 
the reason for the choice of the dependent variable. Furthermore, the 
selection of theoretical perspectives and three sets of independent vari-
ables will be discussed and explained. Finally, the methodology for this 
case study will be presented. 
2.1 ‘Regime’ versus ‘Institution’ 
The concepts of ‘regime’ and ‘institution’ are often used interchangeably, 
even though regimes can be seen as a sub-group of institutions (Rosendal 
1999: 11). It is therefore important to specify these two terms, so as to be 
able to distinguish between them. The so-called consensus definition of 
regimes most commonly used was first proposed by Stephen Krasner. 
According to Krasner (1983: 2), regimes are: 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, 
causation,  and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined 
in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions 
or proscriptions for action, Decision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective 
choice.  
Levy et al. (1995: 274) suggests a somewhat similar definition of inter-
national regimes as being ‘social institutions consisting of agreed upon 
principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the inter-
action of actors in specific issue areas’.1 On the other hand, according to 
Keohane et al. (1993: 4), institutions can be understood as “persistent and 
connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioural roles, 
constrain activity and shape expectations, They may take the form of 
bureaucratic organizations, regimes [...], or conventions (informal 
practices). As proposed by this definition, ‘institutions’ may be used as a 
more general term, including both organizations and sets of rules, 
codified in conventions and protocols that have been formally accepted 
by states. It is important to note that also the terms institutions and 
organizations have often been used interchangeably, even though 
organizations is a narrower concept, referring to ‘material entities posses-
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sing physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and 
budgets’ (Young 1989: 31f). Following this, the CSD can not be regarded 
as a regime as it is not restricted to a specific issue-area, but is rather 
directed towards a broad range of issues as formulated in Agenda 21. 
However, the CSD can be described as an institution with organizational 
attributes, such as a secretary and equipment placed in New York. 
Why then draw on regime theory in the study of the CSD? In Kratochwil 
and Ruggie’s (1986) presentation of theory evolution, it is shown how the 
focus on international regimes became the main approach to study inter-
national governance after the decline of American hegemony during the 
1970s and beyond. Thus, for analytical purposes it will be reasonable to 
draw on regime theory in the study of the CSD.  
2.2 Regime theory 
Neoliberal, or interest-based, theories of regimes have come to represent 
the mainstream approach to analyzing international institutions. The main 
objective is to explain how institutions help states to realize common 
interests and thus, facilitate cooperation (Hasenclever et al. 1997). Most 
theories of regimes are state-centred, and the basic assumptions of state 
actors are based on rational choice models (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 
499). Actors are portrayed as unitary and rational behaving units that act 
to promote their interests. They are assumed to have consistently ordered 
preferences and choose among alternative courses of action so as to 
further these preferences. Moreover, actors are assumed to be ‘egoistic’, 
that is, their preferences shall be oriented toward maximizing their own 
well-being.2 Also, mainstream regime theory draws heavily on both econ-
omical theories focusing on information and transaction costs, and game-
theoretic models, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, to explain how interna-
tional institutions can facilitate cooperation among states (Hasenclever et 
al. 1997: 4).  
Robert Keohane’s contractual (or functional) theory is regarded as one of 
the most significant approaches within regime theory. A main objective 
was to relax the basic actor assumptions of rationality and egoism, and 
thus lay the premises of empathy, changes in preferences and bounded 
rationality when explaining cooperation among actors. The analysis is 
based on constellations of interests, where the existence of common inter-
ests is seen as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for cooperation. 
As noted by Keohane (1984: 97), cooperation may not be possible even 
when mutual interests exist, because of obstacles such as uncertainty, 
lack of information and fear of cheating. Hence, international institutions 
can help states realize common interests by removing main obstacles, 
and, with that, make cooperation possible ‘not by implementing rules that 
states must follow, but by changing the context within which states make 
decisions based on self-interests’ (Keohane 1984: 13)  
The study of international regimes has focused on different stages of the 
regime process. Early regime analysis was concentrated on the formation 
stage, and identifying the conditions under which international regimes 
form, and the output of the formation process. As this analytical exercise 
failed to address the question of whether regimes matter, more resent 
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research has been concerned of the implementation stage and regime 
effectiveness (Levy et al. 1995: 287). 
2.3 The Dependent Variable: The CSD’s Accomplishments 
One of the main challenges concerning research of regimes and institu-
tions has been related to the question of how to evaluate and measure 
effectiveness. In general, according to Underdal (2002: 4), ‘a regime [or 
an institution] can be considered effective to the extent that it successfully 
performs a certain (set of) function(s) or solves the problem(s) that moti-
vated its establishment’.3 The concept of effectiveness has evolved as 
scholars have addressed the question of why some efforts at developing 
and implementing joint solutions to international problems succeed while 
others fail (Underdal 2002: 3). Different approaches have been used in 
the attempt to answer this question. One approach relates to the concept 
of compliance, which is understood as acting in accordance with, and 
fulfilment of, the obligations accepted by signing (and ratifying) the 
agreement (Underdal 1998: 6). However, as noted by Underdal (ibid.), 
‘this concept of “compliance” involves no assumption of causality; i.e. I 
do not assume that rule-consistent behaviour will necessarily be due to 
the existence of a particular agreement’ [emphasis by original]. Thus, 
using the level of compliance as an indicator of effectiveness will pos-
sibly lead to problems regarding validity. Moreover, compliance relates 
to adjustments made by states at the national level, which will not be 
included in this case study. 
Another approach would be to evaluate the level of implementation when 
considering success or failure of problem-solving efforts. The concept of 
‘implementation’ refers to the measures governments take to translate 
international accords into domestic law and policy. When an agreement is 
implemented, it is expected that measures are in effect and target groups 
adjusted. In other words, implementation leads to consequences in the 
form of changes in human behaviour (Underdal 1998: 26; Underdal 2002: 
7). Thus, using implementation as an indicator would be a more valid 
approach, as effectiveness would be measured in terms of behavioural 
change. However, it is important to distinguish between the different 
types of institutional consequences. Easton (1965: 351f) and others 
distinguish between output, outcome and impact. Output is conceived of 
as the norms, principles, and rules generated by the institution itself. 
Outcome refers to the implementation, that is, the changes in the 
behaviour of relevant actors (target groups), while impact connotes the 
tangible consequences affecting the physical problem at hand (Andresen 
and Skjærseth 1999:4).4 In the formation stage and its immediate after-
math, the output, that is, the norms and rules generated by the institution 
itself, is all we know. Thus, the main focus of an effectiveness analysis 
should therefore be in the implementation stage in order to measure effec-
tiveness in terms of behavioural change (Underdal 2002: 6f). However, it 
is important to note that the outcome and the impact of a regime or an 
institution can be determined only in retrospect – meaning several years 
after its entry into force. Underdal (1992: 230) points out that ‘if we want 
to evaluate regime effectiveness at an earlier stage – as we often do – the 
regime itself will be all that is known to us’.  
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In the study of the CSD, evaluating and measuring effectiveness in terms 
of behavioural change would be a difficult, if not impossible, task.5 As 
the CSD was established in 1994, it can be considered a rather immature 
institution. Therefore, what we know in this case is mostly the output of 
the decision-making process. Thus, my intention will be to indicate the 
effectiveness of CSD on the basis of data about the output, an exercise 
that has to be pursued with great caution. This concerns implications of 
causality, which will be discussed further in section 2.8. Moreover, since 
it would be premature to evaluate changes in the behaviour of relevant 
actors, this implies that using the level of implementation as an indicator 
of effectiveness would not be possible in this study. 
‘The CSD’s accomplishments’ will be defined as the dependent variable 
in this case. The CSD’s accomplishments will refer to the rules, pro-
grams, means and efforts (i.e. the output) that have been decided upon by 
actors. The mandate of the CSD will serve as the point of reference, 
against which the accomplishments are to be compared. In order to mea-
sure the dependent variable, a scale of high, medium and low score will 
be used. High score implies that the output is consistent with the goals of 
the mandate, and low score is understood as the output not being 
consistent with the goals. The degree of the CSD’s accomplishments will 
be determined by, first, to evaluate the decision-making process during 
the period 1993-2001. Second, several experts will be asked to give a 
score of the CSD’s accomplishments regarding how they consider the 
degree of goal attainment.  
2.4 Two Explanatory Perspectives 
In order to study which mechanisms explain the degree of the CSD’s 
accomplishments, effectiveness theory provides some fruitful analytical 
tools for this case. Underdal (2002: 13) proposes two theoretical perspec-
tives, ‘character of the problem’ and ‘problem-solving capacity’, which 
illuminate different aspects of an institution or a regime. The ‘character 
of the problem’ may explain why some problems are harder to solve than 
others. Whether a problem can be regarded malign or benign is due to 
differences in ‘intellectual’ and ‘political’ characteristics (Andresen and 
Skjærseth 1999). The ‘problem-solving capacity’ may explain why some 
problems are solved more effectively than others because of variations in 
the institutional design or because they are attacked with greater skill or 
energy (Underdal 2002: 23).  
Most likely, the ‘problem-solving capacity’ perspective would be most 
fruitful approach to use for the analysis, since my main objective for the 
study of the CSD is to understand how it would be possible to enhance 
the CSD’s potential for effectiveness. Where as the ‘character of the 
problem’ is a more static explanatory perspective, the ‘problem-solving 
capacity’ perspective can provide useful insights of how to improve the 
work of the CSD. However, Underdal (2002: 14f) points out that these 
perspectives cannot be seen as mutually independent; ‘notions of capacity 
will have to be matched with notions of problem type and task’. A main 
assumption is that a malign problem will affect the problem-solving 
capacity differently than a benign problem As the character of the 
problem is expected to affect the problem-solving capacity, it will be 
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important to determine whether the problem can be considered malign or 
benign. I will therefore define the character of the problem prior to the 
analysis, in order to understand the CSD’s potential for fulfilling its 
goals.  
However, since the CSD is not restricted to a specific issue-area, but is 
rather directed towards a broad range of issues as formulated in Agenda 
21, it will be difficult to define the problem in this case. As the CSD’s 
mandate and functions concerns the work of advancing the sustainable 
development agenda, my suggestion is to consider ‘sustainable develop-
ment’ as the problem. In my opinion, this is a reasonable choice, because 
many of the challenges and interest conflicts related to the work on 
sustainable development also affect the CSD.  
2.5 The ‘Character of the Problem’ Perspective  
According to Underdal (2002: 15) a ‘problem’ have both intellectual and 
political characteristics, which affect the problem-solving capacity. As a 
starting point, I will propose that the problem of ‘sustainable develop-
ment’ can be regarded as both intellectually and politically malign. First, 
intellectual aspects of a problem are related to the scientific capacity 
needed to develop adequate solutions (Andresen and Skjærseth 1999: 5). 
Concerning the CSD, the problem of sustainable development can be 
considered as intellectually malign for several reasons: there is a lack of a 
consensus definition; specific knowledge of the problem is hard to attain, 
because it involves so many sub-problems; and the problem can be 
considered to be complex because it consists both internal and external 
linkages, as many sectors are affected, and many international institutions 
and organizations are involved in the problem-solving.  
Second, political aspects of the problem are primarily linked to the 
degree of asymmetry in actors’ interests and preferences (Andresen and 
Skjærseth 1999: 5). Keohane (1984: 6) points out one important precon-
dition for solving a problem, that states must have interests in common 
which can only be realized through cooperation. Still, it cannot be taken 
for granted that states with interests in common will also cooperate. The 
main obstacles to cooperation, analyzed by Keohane (1984), are uncer-
tainty, lack of information and fear of cheating. Lack of information 
about the other actors’ objections and commitments, leads to uncertainty 
and the fear of cheating. Thus, institutions can facilitate cooperation by 
providing states with information or reducing their information costs 
(Keohane 1984: 97, 245). However, as stressed by Hasenclever et al. 
(1997: 32); ‘it is not interests (preferences over outcome) that are adjust-
ed when states cooperate, but policies (preferences over actions)’. Fol-
lowing this, institutions facilitate cooperation not by changing actors’ 
interests or values, but by altering their ‘incentives’ for action. Regarding 
the political aspect of the problem, the degree of asymmetry in actors’ 
interests and preferences will be affected by whether the states’ prefer-
ences over action are identical, complementary or incompatible. The 
more asymmetric the preferences are, the harder it will be to solve the 
problem at hand (Skjærseth 1991: 28). Following this, ‘sustainable 
development’ is related to a longstanding interest conflict between North-
ern and Southern countries on the issues of environment and develop-
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ment. Where as the North has most often stressed the importance of 
environmental protection and conservation, the South has mostly been 
concerned of the development agenda. This conflict has influenced the 
decision-making process of the CSD concerning issues such as financial 
resources, technology transfer, and consumption and production. Accord-
ing Bergesen and Botnen (1996: 42-47), the discussions on these issues 
have been affected by incompatible preferences between the Northern 
and Southern countries. McNeill (2000: 23) notes that ‘sustainable devel-
opment is an intensely political issue’. Thus, I will consider the problem 
of sustainable development to be politically malign due to asymmetric 
interests. Following this, as the problem of ‘sustainable development’ can 
be considered both intellectually and politically malign, the CSD has a 
difficult starting point for fulfilling its goal.  
2.6 The ‘Problem-Solving Capacity’ Perspective - Three Sets 
of Explanatory Variables 
Underdal (2002: 23) propose that ‘problem-solving capacity’ can be con-
ceived of as a function of three main determinants: the institutional set-
ting (the rules of the game); the distribution of power among the actors 
involved; and the skill and energy available for the political engineering 
of cooperative solutions. The term ‘institutional setting’ is used broadly 
as a label for two different notions of institutions – namely, institutions as 
arenas and organizations as actors. ‘Power’ is understood as a source of 
leadership, and is defined narrowly as the control over important events. 
‘Skills and energy’ refers to the exercise of instrumental leadership 
(Underdal 2002: 24-35). 
These three determinants of problem-solving capacity will serve as a 
starting point for the analysis of the CSD. However, some changes will 
be made due to the relevance for the study. Thus, the ‘problem-solving 
capacity’ will refer to three sets of explanatory variables: ‘institutional 
design’, ‘distribution of capabilities’ and ‘entrepreneurial leadership’. 
The exploration of ‘institutional design’ will concern the institutional fac-
tors of ‘the role of the secretariat’, ‘states’ sector representation’ and 
‘nonstate actors’ access and participation’. When evaluating the distribu-
tion of capabilities, the main focus will be states’ interests, positions and 
capabilities. Finally, I will use the term ‘entrepreneurial leadership’, pro-
posed by Young (1991: 287), when reviewing the possibility of leader-
ship exercised by individuals. 
2.6.1 Institutional design 
The main argument in regime theory is that international institutions 
matter. However, some international institutions make more impact and 
contribute to greater effectiveness than others, because of their specific 
institutional features. It is therefore important to analyze how an institu-
tion is designed in order to understand why it is effective or ineffective, 
and moreover, to understand how it would be possible to enhance its 
effectiveness. According to Wettestad (1999: 2), ‘the existence and 
design of international institutions may become critically important in 
order to transform political opportunities into new or stronger commit-
ments’, especially concerning malign problems. Many institutional fac-
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tors provide interesting insights to the significance of institutional design. 
Due to relevance, however, I will focus on ‘the role of the secretariat’, 
‘the states’ sector representation’, and ‘NGOs’ access and participation’. 
The Role of the Secretariat 
A secretariat can be regarded as an international organization established 
by the relevant parties to assist them in fulfilling an institution’s main 
goal(s). Since state actors often have different interests and preferences, a 
well-functioning secretariat can assist the actors in cooperating and 
thereby solving the problem at hand more effectively (Andresen and 
Skjærseth 1999: 2, 6). Wettestad (1999: 26f) makes a distinction between 
two main roles of secretariats: assistant or player. The assistant secretar-
iat acts as a behind-the-scenes adviser; provides administrative assistance 
to the parties in document preparation as requested; and collects and 
compiles follow-up reports from the parties. The player secretariat is 
described as an active and independent actor as it initiates and actively 
participates in agenda setting and protocol development; facilitate, and in 
some cases initiates, the development of parallel or single negotiating 
texts; framing central questions; acting as moderator or mediator in the 
events of negotiation stalemates; and take an active role in the analyses 
and dissemination of the parties follow-up reports (Wettestad 1999: 27). 
Andresen and Skjærseth (1999: 7ff) point out that a well-functioning 
secretariat should also be able to develop and maintain good relations 
with member countries, have sufficient funding to carry out their tasks 
properly and assure credibility across the North-South interests.  
The States’ Sector Representation 
Most research concerning state participation has focused on the type of 
representation, that is, whether the participants are administrative-level 
bureaucratic or higher-level political, like ministers (Wettestad 1999: 23). 
In this case, however, the focus will be directed towards the sector 
background of the state participants. In other words, it will be important 
to study what kind of sectors of the national arena the delegation 
members are drawn from. Rosendal (2000: 87) points out that ‘national 
interests’ ‘may be represented differently by different sectors of the 
administration’. Likewise, high-level politicians, like ministers, with dif-
ferent sector background will also represent different interests. Exempli-
fied with Allison’s words, where you stand depends on where you sit, an 
environmental minister will be expected to stress environmental issues 
more than the ministers in other ministries (Allison 1971: 176). Regard-
ing the CSD, its work concerns advancing the sustainable development 
agenda, which consists of three main dimensions: environmental, social 
and economical issues. In order to place the same emphasis on all three 
dimensions, it would be expected that all three sectors should be 
represented.  
Nonstate Actors’ Access and Participation 
As a starting point, it is important to note that access refers to the rules 
regulating the possibility of participation, while participation is under-
stood as the actual participation of various groups (Wettestad 1999: 20). 
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The term nonstate actor can be understood as any organization that does 
not have a formal or legal status as a state or agent of a state (Raustiala 
2001: 97f). In this regard, it is important to note that Agenda 21 identified 
nine major groups, and recognised that the participation of these groups 
would be necessary for advancing the sustainable development agenda6 
(Agarwal et al. 2001: 196). Hence, ‘nonstate actors’ will here refer to 
‘major groups’.  
Concerning the effect of nonstate actors’ access and participation, it is 
important to evaluate the difference between open and inclusive rules of 
access and exclusive opportunities for participation. Wettestad (1999: 21) 
points out the dilemma of the conflicting concerns for openness and legi-
timacy versus decision-making effectiveness. A negotiation process in-
cluding all relevant parties will bring legitimacy to the final decisions. On 
the other hand, however, a large number of participants may affect the 
decision-making effectiveness and lower the highest common denomin-
ator achievable in a negotiation process. Moreover, openness and inclu-
siveness can also lead to rhetorical and symbolic show-off session, where 
words become more important than action. Still, according to Levy et al. 
(1994: 11) ‘it is more or less uncontested that the participation of non-
state actors and epistemic communities, at least in the rule implementa-
tion stage, does improve the effectiveness of international environmental 
regimes’. Thus, nonstate actors may enhance output effectiveness by 
providing information, creativity and new ideas to the process; helping 
states identifying their interests; framing issues for collective debate; 
proposing specific policies; and identifying salient points for negotiation 
(Haas 1992: 2).  
Summing up, I will present the following propositions: 
P1:  An active, independent and financially strong secretariat will 
enhance the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments.  
P2:  A broad and diversified sector representation of the states will 
enhance the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments. 
P3:  Open and inclusive rules of access and participation of a large 
number of nonstate actors will enhance the degree of the CSD’s 
accomplishments.  
2.6.2 Distribution of Capabilities 
It is reasonable to assume that the distribution of capabilities among state 
actors will affect the problem-solving process and have an impact on an 
institution’s effectiveness. In order to evaluate how the capabilities are 
distributed, it will first be important to evaluate the state actors’ interests 
as to understand the positions the states have in the negotiation process. It 
will be assumed that the parties act as pushers, bystanders, intermediates 
or laggards. Second, it will be necessary to examine the relationship be-
tween the actors’ interests and their capability to achieve actual break-
through in the negotiation process.  
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Interests, Positions and Capabilities 
In order to understand the positions the states have in the negotiation 
process, it will be important to evaluate the states’ interests. The interests 
will be reviewed in relations to the environmental, economic and social 
dimensions of sustainable development. It is reasonable to assume that a 
state’s interest will determine its position. Thus, the interests will affect 
whether the state acts as a pusher, bystander, intermediate or a laggard 
(Rosendal 2000: 116f).7 A pusher will here refer to a state that wants a 
strong CSD and a high degree of goal attainment, and therefore tries to 
enhance the decision-making process and push it in a positive direction. 
Opposite, a state that wants a weak CSD and a low degree of goal attain-
ment, and attempts to slow down the decision-making process, will be 
referred to as a laggard. While Intermediate states will presumably take a 
position somewhere between pushers and laggards, bystanders will here 
be understood as states that are indifferent (Rosendal 2000: 117). As 
pushers and laggards are expected to affect the decision-making process 
the most, the focus of the analysis will mainly concern the possibility of 
these two positions.  
However, the states’ positions alone do not determine which states that 
achieve actual breakthrough in the negotiation process. It is the capabili-
ties of states that give them the potential for influence. As noted by 
Rosendal (2000: 117), ‘the label “pusher” refers not only to the relation-
ship between a party’s position and interest, but also to the capabilities 
available for pursuing these interests’. Thus, the distribution of capabili-
ties among state actors will affect the decision-making process of an 
institution, because the decisions will reflect the interests of the powerful 
actors. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the state actors’ capabilities, in 
order to identify which states have been the most powerful in the 
negotiation process and have achieved actual breakthrough for their 
interests. In general, ‘capabilities’ will refer to the possession of the 
material resources.  
Concerning the potential for influence, it may also be relevant to evaluate 
the states’ coalition size. Underdal (2002: 31) points out that, in a system 
practising the rule of consensus, ‘coalition size will be an asset, exerting 
social pressure on a reluctant minority’. As the CSD practices the rule of 
consensus, like the UN in general, it is reasonable to assume that 
coalition size will be significant for influence in the negotiations. 
Summing up, I will present the following proposition: 
P4:  If the most powerful actors act as pushers, the degree of CSD’s 
accomplishments will be enhanced. 
2.6.3 Entrepreneurial Leadership  
Scholars often distinguish between three types of leadership. Young 
(1991: 287) calls these forms of leadership structural, entrepreneurial 
and intellectual leadership. Interest-based perspectives are mostly 
concerned about entrepreneurial leadership, which is understood as ‘an 
individual who relies on negotiating skill to frame issues in ways that 
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foster integrative bargaining and to put together deals that would other-
wise preclude participants’ (Young 1991: 293). As noted above, actors 
most likely enter negotiations with incomplete and imperfect information. 
Underdal (2002: 34) points out that ‘this implies that discovering, invent-
ing and exploring possible solutions may be important elements of the 
process’. Therefore, the political engineering of effective solutions, that 
is, the exercise of entrepreneurial leadership, might be a central dimen-
sion to evaluate in order to explain an institution’s effectiveness. First, it 
is important to understand what kind of skills, energy and status an 
entrepreneurial leader might have in order to evaluate its ability to 
facilitate cooperation and enhance the problem-solving effectiveness. 
Second, I will explain the means an entrepreneurial leader use to exercise 
leadership. 
An entrepreneurial leader’s ability to find means to solve collective solu-
tions is determined by their capabilities, that is, skills, energy and status. 
Skills, both substantial and political, are here understood as negotiation 
skills. Energy refers to a function of capacity and interest, while status 
includes both formal position in the negotiations and the more vague 
notion of ‘reputation’. Energy and status are both capabilities that are 
linked to the entity the individual represents. It is important here to point 
out the difference between individuals and entities. Although leaders 
often act on behalf of entities, they are themselves individuals. An 
entrepreneurial leader may act on the behalf of various entities, such as 
states, coalition of states, nonstate actors, secretariats and so on (Skodvin 
Hegdal 1994: 5). 
In order to understand the source of entrepreneurial leadership, it is im-
portant to evaluate what kind of situations that create space and needs for 
such leadership. When a problem can be considered malign, the demand 
for an entrepreneurial leader will increase because of the need for 
reducing insecurity, unveiling actual preferences and identifying various 
solutions. However, in such situations it is reasonable to believe that the 
negotiations would be distributive, rather than integrative. Thus, situa-
tions concerning malign problems will have a need for skilled leaders, but 
the space for leadership will be limited (Skjærseth 1991: 32). Moreover, 
it is important to note that also actors’ preferences, institutional design 
and distribution of capabilities will affect the need and space for entrepre-
neurial leadership (Underdal 2002: 33) The source of entrepreneurial 
leadership can be understood as the accept or acknowledgement among 
relevant actors for exercising such leadership (Skjærseth 1991: 32).  
The means an entrepreneurial leader use in order to exercise leadership 
can be linked to the different tasks such a leader has. Underdal (2002: 35) 
points out three major tasks: a) designing substantive solutions that are 
politically feasible; b) designing institutional arrangements that are 
conductive to the development, adoption, and implementation of effective 
solutions; and c) designing actor strategies that can be effective in induc-
ing constructive cooperation. The main focus of this case study will be to 
explore to what extent one or more of these tasks of entrepreneurial 
leadership was in fact performed.  
Summing up, I will present the following proposition: 
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P5:  If entrepreneurial leadership is exercised by individuals, the 
degree of the CSD’s accomplishments will be enhanced. 
2.7 Interaction Between the Explanatory Variables 
The three sets of explanatory variables outlined here illuminate different 
aspects and provide different explanations of the CSD and its achieve-
ments. However, it is reasonable to expect that these variables also inter-
act and work together regarding the explanation of the CSD’s perform-
ances. Thus, they are considered as more complementary than incompat-
ible. Even though I have derived different propositions about which 
mechanisms explain the CSD’s accomplishments, based on the three sets 
of explanatory variables, I assume that all of the variables will help me to 
give answers to my research questions.  
As these variables most likely interact and affect each other concerning 
their impact on the achievements of the CSD, it is difficult make any 
assumptions as to which variable have the most explanatory power. Thus, 
in order to gain clarity and a better understanding of how each of the 
variables has affected the CSD’s accomplishments, the independent vari-
ables will first be evaluate separately (Rosendal 1999: 50). Then, I will 
explore how the three sets of variables may have interacted with each 
other. Following this, my general assumption is that the explanatory vari-
ables together would serve as a more comprehensive explanation of the 
degree of the CSD’s accomplishments than the variables can provide 
separately.  
2.8 Methodology 
2.8.1 Designing a Qualitative Case Study 
The research design for the study of the CSD is a qualitative case study. 
The general purpose of this research strategy is to analyze few subject 
matter in order to study the material in-depth (Andersen 1997: 121). 
Qualitative case studies are used to explain the causal links in real-life 
interventions that are too complex for other strategies, such as for surveys 
or experiments (Yin 1994: 15). Thus, a qualitative case study can be used 
to enhance the understanding of dynamic relations, processes and patterns 
of collaboration. 
In order to interpret a study’s findings, a preliminary theory is needed. 
The theoretical perspective(s) adopted for this study will direct the selec-
tion of explanatory variables that will be useful to guide data collection 
and analysis (Yin 1994: 13). Also, a case study inquiry relies on multiple 
approaches and sources of information, called triangulation, in order to 
achieve valid and reliable results. Data triangulation, which will be 
discussed in this section, is understood as the use of multiple data sources 
in the study (Yin 1994: 92). According to Yin (ibid.) the most important 
advantage presented by using data triangulation is ‘the development of 
converging lines of inquiry’. This concerns construct validity, which is 
understood as establishing correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied. The potential problems of construct validity can be 
addressed with triangulation, because the multiple sources of information 
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can provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Yin 1994: 33). 
The use of multiple sources of information will be further explored 
below.  
The concept of internal validity, concerns establishing a causal relation-
ship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as 
distinguished from spurious relationships (Yin 1994: 33). Regarding this 
case, as noted above, it will be a methodological challenge to study the 
possibility for causal connections between the CSD and the actual accom-
plishments, due to the problem of internal validity. There are many 
factors that can influence the accomplishments, so it is difficult to isolate 
the effect of the CSD. External relations, such as great public interest and 
pressure in a certain time period due to major environmental disasters 
may explain the accomplishments. Moreover, the CSD is linked to other 
UN bodies and other international organizations in its work on sustain-
able development. Therefore, international processes and efforts by inter-
national organizations may have an effect on the accomplishments of the 
CSD. Also, domestic relations can be an explanatory factor, such as 
replacement of the US presidency that might change the USA’s position 
from pusher to laggard or the opposite. It is also important to note that the 
CSD’s mandate can be described as very broad and involves few 
obligations for the member states (Khor 1994: 103; Yamin 1998/99: 56f). 
Since efforts by the states can be regarded as voluntary, it is difficult to 
consider whether the accomplishments are a direct (or indirect) effect of 
the CSD, or whether the accomplishments would have been made 
regardless of the CSD.  
An important point here is that it is a complex interplay between multiple 
factors that might effect the CSD’s accomplishments. Even though there 
is a correlation between the CSD and the actual accomplishments, this 
does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship. The correlation may 
be explained by spurious factors, as shown above. Also, the causal con-
nection might go in the opposite direction. However, it has become an 
accepted fact that international institutions matter to multilateral coopera-
tion. Thus, as a starting point I will assume the actual accomplishments 
are due to the effect of the CSD. The main challenge of the case will then 
be to study whether the potential correlation is due to a causal effect of 
the CSD, or whether the correlation can be explained by spurious rela-
tions. To identify a causal connection, different analytic strategies may be 
used, such as process tracing and the method of counterfactuals. 
Process tracing relates to the strategy of studying the decision process by 
which various initial conditions are translated into outputs and outcomes. 
As noted by King et al. (1994: 227) ‘a theory that links initial conditions 
to outcomes will often imply a particular set of motivations or percep-
tions on the part of [...] actors’. This strategy involves the search for 
evidence - evidence consistent with the overall causal theory - about the 
decision process when accomplishments are being done. One of the strat-
egies being used in this study to establish causality is therefore to trace 
the negotiation process from the ‘end product’ – the accomplishments – 
and back to the beginning of the negotiations. Explicit references of the 
states’ actions in various documents or judgements of key informants can 
be used as indicators of the accomplishments (ibid.).  
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Another approach, which will be used in this study, is to evaluate the 
degree of accomplishments in relation to the goals that have been formu-
lated by relevant parties (Jacobsen and Kay 1983: 18). As noted above, 
the established and formulated mandate will be understood as the main 
goal of the CSD, and will serve as the point of reference, against which 
the accomplishments are to be compared. However, it is important to note 
that achieving a declared goal does not necessarily imply that the parties 
involved have accomplished all that could be accomplished (Underdal 
1990: 9). Moreover, if the goal is not explicitly formulated by the parties, 
it is a difficult criterion to use. Therefore, it is important to be aware of 
the possibility of validity problems when using this approach.  
To a lesser degree, I will also use the method of counterfactuals. This is a 
strategy that involves systematically reconstructing how the course of 
event would have developed in the absence of a regime or an institution 
(Young and Levy 1999: 18). A counterfactual analysis can be described 
as a thought experiment where the expected decisions and efforts in the 
absence of the institution are identified, and then compared with the 
actual events. However, the method of counterfactuals is a highly time-
consuming and complex approach to use. Therefore, it will not be possi-
ble to carry through this strategy thoroughly due to the scope of this case 
study. Thus, I will only indicate the possibility of other conditions than 
the CSD that may have been significant for the accomplishments.   
2.8.2 The Case of the CSD - With the Ambition of Generalization? 
Case studies have often been criticized as an inadequate research method 
because of the inability to generalize. However, it is important to note 
that the rejection of case studies as unscientific or unsuitable for theory 
development is due to the lacking ability to satisfy the demand of statisti-
cal generalization. The possibility to generalize based on a case study 
does not concern statistic, but rather analytical or theoretical representa-
tivity (Andersen 1997: 14). As pointed out by Yin (1994: 31), analytical 
generalization refers to a method where ‘a previously developed theory is 
used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case 
study. If two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, replica-
tion may be claimed’.  
The research method used here, will be a single-case study. I will there-
fore explore how fruitful the theoretical framework will be for the study 
of the CSD. Thus, different theoretical perspectives will be applied in 
order to evaluate the empirical results (Andersen 1997: 68f). The theoreti-
cal perspectives have guided the formulation of propositions that might 
explain the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments. These propositions 
will be regarded as complementary, rather than incompatible. This means 
that empirical data that strengthen one of the propositions does not neces-
sarily weaken the others (Baune 1991: 34). However, it is still important 
to evaluate the validity of the propositions to study the CSD’s accom-
plishments. A preliminary assumption is that the validity of the proposi-
tions will differ and the explanatory power will be unequal in relation to 
each aspect being studied. An important task of this case study will be to 
show the theoretical perspectives’ ability to explain the effect of an 
international institution. I do not have the ambition to contribute to theory 
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development, but hopefully this study will contribute to the understand-
ing of how the theoretical perspectives may explain which mechanisms 
affect the accomplishments of an institution.  
2.8.3 Sources of Information 
In order to analyze the CSD, I have used the method of data triangulation 
by gathering data from various qualitative sources. First, I have evaluated 
several types of primary and secondary documentary information, such as 
official documents from the UN, other formal studies or evaluations of 
the CSD and secondary documents like the Earth Negotiation Bulletin 
(ENB). Second, I have also conducted several interviews in which the 
selection of respondents has been based on their degree of involvement 
and/or their position in the decision-making process. The main purpose of 
selecting multiple sources of information is to strengthen the validity by 
triangulation. Therefore, I have chosen various sources with different 
biases and strength and used them complementary.  
The primary documents used in this study are mostly official UN docu-
ments. These include the documents adopted by the states at the CSD 
sessions and official documents from the General Assembly (GA) and 
ECOSOC concerning the CSD. Also, official documents from UNCED 
and UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) will be evaluated. 
The purposes of these sources will be: 1) to study the decision-making 
process, that is, to see which decisions that have been adopted by the 
parties; and 2) to use these decisions as a source of evidence when evalu-
ating which mechanisms explain the CSD’s accomplishments. Secondary 
sources have also been used, such as other formal studies or evaluations 
of the CSD. ENB contains detailed daily and summary reports of the CSD 
sessions, workshops and other meetings concerning the CSD, as well as 
media reports and press releases. Since ENB have followed the process of 
the CSD from the beginning, these reports have been useful to evaluate 
the possibility of changes during the time period of the study. 
Interviews have also been an important part of the data used for this study 
of the CSD. I have conducted several interviews, which have served as 
sources of information that have been difficult to obtain through written 
documents. I have also used the interviews to test the validity of the 
information from written sources. The selection of respondents has been 
based on availability, on their degree of involvement and/or their position 
in the decision-making process. As the respondent information is often 
assumed to be biased, it has been important to strive for a broad selection 
of respondents. 
Availability has been one of the main challenges when selecting respond-
ents. Thus, almost half of the interviews have been conducted in Oslo, 
with representatives from the Norwegian Ministry of Environment and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The other interviews have been done in New 
York, with representatives from the CSD secretariat and the permanent 
UN missions of Norway and South Africa, and a NGO representative 
from ENB. These respondents have also been selected on the basis of 
their various positions in the decision-making process, in order to obtain 
broad and balanced information. Another challenge has been to find 
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potential respondents that have participated in the entire period 1993-
2001, as the CSD has a high rate of replacements. However, three of my 
respondents, Idunn Eidheim, Hiroko Morita-Lou and Pamela Chasek, 
have been involved in the CSD process throughout the whole period. 
The interviews have been conducted with an open interview guide, in 
order to adjust the questions in regard to what position the respondent 
have or what part of the process the respondent has been involved in. All 
of the interviews in Oslo, and one of the interviews in New York, have 
been recorded on tape, so as to provide a more accurate rendition (Yin 
1994: 86). For the interviews with representatives from the CSD secretar-
iat and the permanent UN missions, a clearance process was needed in 
order to use a tape recorder. Thus, I chose to use notes to record the 
information.  
3. Background History 
The CSD was established through a process that lasted from UNCED’s 
Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) IV to the first substantial session of 
the CSD. Thus, I will here give a short presentation of the formation 
process. Also, I will present the CSD’s formulated mandate, its main 
functions and work programme, and its place within the UN system.  
3.1 Pre-UNCED and UNCED 
One of the most difficult issues to be resolved during the UNCED prep-
aratory process was concerning the establishment of institutional arrange-
ments necessary for the follow-up of UNCED. Still, this issue was not 
addressed until the fourth and last session of the PrepCom. PrepCom IV, 
chaired by Tommy Koh (Singapore), was held from 2 March to 4 April 
1992. Working Group III was responsible for the legal and institutional 
issues, where Ambassador Ismail Razali from Malaysia was pointed out 
as Coordinator (ENB 1992a: 3). 
The starting point of negotiation for both Northern and Southern coun-
tries in the working group was that they agreed that they should not create 
any new institutions. However, Razali presented a draft text as the basis 
for negotiations which proposed the establishment of a Sustainable 
Development Commission to monitor sustainable development perform-
ance at international, national and regional levels (ENB 1992a: 3). The 
proposal generate substantial debate, where as Norway wanted to 
establish the Commission directly under the GA, most states preferred to 
place the suggested Commission under ECOSOC (Leiro 2004; Schei 
2004 [interviews]). However, the delegates finally agreed to a revised 
draft text presented by Razali. In the final draft, Razali presented two 
options for intergovernmental mechanisms; to establish a high-level 
Sustainable Development Commission as a main subsidiary organ of 
ECOSOC and the GA that would report directly to the GA on policy and 
to ECOSOC on coordination; or to establish a similar mechanism within 
a revitalized ECOSOC. He also proposed that the choice between these 
options should be left to UNCED, and that the 47th session of the GA 
(UNGA-47) should work out the modalities. The final draft presented to 
the Plenary was then adopted (ENB 1992b). 
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UNCED was held 3-14 June 1992 under the chairmanship of Secretary-
General Maurice Strong. Ismael Razali was Chair for the Institutions con-
tact group, which addressed issues such as the role, functions and report-
ing structure of the proposed Sustainable Development Commission 
(ENB 1992c). Three main documents were adopted by the delegates at 
UNCED: Agenda 21, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment and The Forest Principles. Agenda 21 provided for the establish-
ment of the CSD in Chapter 38. The delegates also agreed to call on the 
GA to work out the modalities of CSD at its 47th session. 
3.2 Post-UNCED 
3.2.1 The Establishment of the CSD and Its Mandate 
UNCED had left many considerations to the GA at its 47th session. One 
of the main tasks was to work out the organizational issues regarding the 
CSD. The GA decided to adopt the UN Resolution 47/191, which 
requested ECOSOC, at its organizational session for 1993, to set up a 
high-level Commission on Sustainable Development as a functional com-
mission of the Council. The establishment of the CSD was requested in 
order to ensure effective follow-up to the Conference, as well as to 
enhance international cooperation and rationalize the intergovernmental 
decision-making capacity for the integration of environment and develop-
ment issues and to examine the progress of the implementation of Agenda 
21 at the national, regional and international levels. The GA also recom-
mended several functions for the Commission (UN 1993b). The CSD was 
finally established at a Special Session of ECOSOC in February 1993 
(Resolution 1993/207). As recommended by UNGA-47, the CSD’s 
mandate was agreed to: 
• monitor progress on the implementation of Agenda 21 and activi-
ties related to the integration of environmental and developmental 
goals through analysis and evaluation of reports from governments, 
NGOs and other UN bodies; 
• review the progress in the implementation of the commitments set 
forth in Agenda 21, including those related to the provision of 
financial resources and transfer of technology; 
• review and monitor progress towards the target of 0.7% of GNP 
from developed countries for official development assistance 
(ODA);  
• review the adequacy of funding and mechanisms, including efforts 
to reach the objectives agreed in chapter 33 of Agenda 21, includ-
ing targets where applicable; 
• receive and analyze relevant information from competent NGOs in 
the context of Agenda 21 implementation; 
• consider, where appropriate, information regarding the progress 
made in the implementation of environmental conventions, which 
could be made available by the relevant conferences of parties; 
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• enhance dialogue with NGOs, the independent sector, and other 
entities outside the UN system, within the UN framework; 
• provide recommendations to the General Assembly through 
ECOSOC, on the basis of an integrated consideration of the reports 
and issues related to the implementation of Agenda 21; and 
• consider the results of the review to be conducted expeditiously by 
the Secretary-General of all recommendations of the Conference 
for capacity-building programmes, information networks, task 
forces and other mechanisms to support the integration of envi-
ronment and development at regional and subregional levels. (Bigg 
and Dodds 1997: 20f; UN 1993b). 
Also, it was decided that the CSD would consist of 53 rotating member 
states, elected by ECOSOC for a term in office of three years. The Com-
mission would then meet annually for a period of two to three weeks. 
Moreover, ECOSOC decided that, as a transitional measure, an organiza-
tional session of the Commission would be held in February 1993 to elect 
the officers of the CSD Bureau, namely, a chairman, three vice-chairmen 
and a rapporteur, and that the first substantive session would be held in 
New York in June 1993 (UN 1993a).  
3.2.2 The CSD’s Place in the UN System 
The CSD is linked both vertically and horizontally to other parts of the 
UN system (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 21). First, its secretariat, the Division 
on Sustainable Development, reports to one of the Under-Secretaries-
Generals, who in turn assists the Secretary-General. Second, it relates to 
UN agencies and bodies and takes part in an Inter-Agency Committee on 
Sustainable Development (IACSD) with over 20 members.8 The CSD’s 
secretariat, the Division on Sustainable Development, was provided for 
by the GA at its 47th session. The GA called on the Secretary-General to 
establish a clearly identifiable, highly qualified and competent secretariat 
support structure within the new Department for Policy Coordination and 
Sustainable Development (DPCSD) to provide support for the Commis-
sion, the High-level Advisory Board and IACSD (UN 1993b; ENB 
1993a).9 
The High-level Advisory Board was called for in the Agenda 21 as an 
additional tool to strengthen the follow-up of Rio. The GA’s Resolution 
47/191 endorsed the view of the Secretary-General that ‘the High-level 
Advisory Board should consist of eminent persons [...], with recognized 
expertise on the broad spectrum of issues to be dealt with by the 
Commission’. It was also decided that the main task would be to give 
broad consideration to issues related to implementation of Agenda 21, 
taking into account the thematic multi-year programme of work of the 
Commission, and provide expert advice in that regard to the Secretary-
General and through him, to the CSD, the ECOSOC and the GA (UN 
1993b). 
In addition to the relations with the High-level Advisory Board, the CSD 
also took part in IACSD. The IACSD was created as a subsidiary to the 
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Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) to focus specifically 
on sustainable development issues in the UN system.10 The ACC was 
chaired by the Secretary-General and had the task of co-ordinating the 
policies of the different parts of the UN and to follow up the series of 
summits. The IACSD was made up of senior level officials from nine 
core members of the ACC.11 It was asked by the ACC in 1993 to focus on 
four issues: streamlining the existing interagency co-ordination machin-
ery; allocating and sharing responsibilities for Agenda 21 implementation 
by the UN system; monitoring the new financial requirements of UN 
system organizations that relate to Agenda 21; and assessing reporting 
requirements that are related to the implementation of Agenda 21 and 
making recommendations on streamlining (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 22). 
3.2.3 The CSD’s Work Programme 
The CSD’s work programme for the first four years was agreed on at its 
first session in 1993. The Multi-Year Thematic Programme of Work inte-
grated the 40 chapters of Agenda 21 into nine clusters: (a) critical ele-
ments of sustainability (including trade and environment, sustainable 
consumption, combating poverty, demographic dynamics, and sustain-
ability); (b) financial resources and mechanisms; (c) education, science, 
transfer of environmentally sound technologies, cooperation, and capacity 
building; (d) decision-making structures; (e) roles of major groups; (f) 
health, human settlements, and fresh water; (g) land desertification, for-
ests, and biodiversity; (h) atmosphere, oceans, and all kinds of seas; and 
(i) toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes. The cross-sectoral issues (a) to 
(e) were to be considered by the Commission annually, while the sectoral 
clusters (f) to (i) were to be considered on a multi-year basis. Thus, (f) 
and (g) would be the main sectoral issues in 1994, (h) in 1995, and (i) in 
1996. At CSD-1, it was also decided that the Commission would conduct 
an overall review of the progress achieved of the work programme and 
the implementation of Agenda 21 in 1997 (Chasek 2000: 380).  
At UNGASS, in 1997, the Multi-Year Programme of Work for the next 
four sessions of the CSD was adopted. The delegates agreed that over-
riding issues for each year would be poverty and consumption and 
production patterns. Themes and sectors to be considered on a multi-year 
basis were: strategic approaches to freshwater management, transfer of 
technology, capacity-building, education, science, awareness-raising and 
industry (1998); oceans and seas, consumption and production patterns 
and tourism (1999); integrated planning and management of land re-
sources, financial resources, trade and investment and economic growth 
and agriculture (2000); and atmosphere, energy, transport, international 
cooperation for an enabling environment, information for decision-
making and participation (2001) (ENB 1997a). 
4. The Decision-Making Process 
In order to evaluate to what degree the CSD has achieved its goals, it is 
necessary to trace the decision-making process when accomplishments 
are being done. Therefore, I will here give a chronological presentation of 
the main decisions made by actors at each session, from CSD-1 to CSD-
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10.12 A rough presentation of the states’ interests and positions related to 
the different issues will also be included.  
4.1 The First Phase 
4.1.1 The First Session of the CSD 
Prior to the first substantive session of the CSD, an organizational session 
was held. During this session, the CSD elected the Chairman and other 
members of the CSD Bureau; discussed the provisional agenda and 
organization of work of the CSD-1; and approved an outline of a multi-
year programme of work for the Commission (ENB 1993b).  
The first substantive session of the CSD was held in New York from 14 
to 25 June 1993, and was chaired by the Malaysian Ambassador Ismael 
Razali. According to the UN report of CSD-1 (UN 1993c), six procedural 
documents were to be negotiated during this session. Most of the agenda 
items dealt with organizing the future work of the Commission. Thus, the 
first substantive session turned out to be a continuation of the organiza-
tional session. The most important decisions adopted by the states were: 
the multi-year thematic programme of work for the Commission; setting 
up reporting processes to channel information from states on efforts to 
implement Agenda 21 into the CSD for review; addressing progress made 
by various parts of the UN system towards incorporating Agenda 21 into 
their operations; addressing progress achieved in facilitating and promot-
ing the transfer of environmentally sound technology, cooperation and 
capacity-building; and addressing initial financial commitments, financial 
flows and arrangements to give effect to the decisions of UNCED from 
all available funding sources and mechanisms (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 
24f; UN 1993c). Moreover, as noted by Chasek (2000: 380f), ‘the Com-
mission also recognized the need for intersessional work to address some 
of the more contentious issues that the CSD would discuss in 1994, 
namely finance and technology transfers’. Thus, it was agreed to establish 
two ad hoc open-ended intersessional working groups with government 
experts that would work out suggestions for the next CSD session on 
specific measures to enhance the implementation of Agenda 21 in these 
two areas (ibid.).  
Regarding the decisions to be adopted, the discussion among actors most-
ly concerned the issues of national reporting, establishing intersessional 
working groups and financial flow and commitments. The discussion 
related to national reporting was a continuation of the debate between the 
Northern and Southern countries during the preparatory process and 
UNCED. The main point, as stressed by many developing-country dele-
gations, was that the information provided by the governments should be 
voluntary. Also, members of G-77/China did not want anyone to examine 
the individual reports or make comparisons between them. The reason for 
this was that the developing countries did not want to create a situation 
where development aid would be linked to national reporting (Chasek 
2000: 383f; ENB 1993c). Regarding the decision to establish two inter-
sessional working groups, the US and the G-77 opposed the proliferation 
of working groups due to the fear of limited participation (G-77) and 
budget implications. In spite of the opposition, the decision was adopted 
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by the Commission (ENB 1993d). The discussion of financial flow and 
commitments concerned a long-standing conflict between North and 
South on financial issues, where as the developing countries pointed out 
the lack of financial resources for the implementation of Agenda 21, the 
developed countries had problems fulfilling their commitment to reach 
the accepted UN target of 0.7% of Gross National Product (GNP) for 
official development assistance (ODA) (ENB 1993e). 
4.1.2 The Second Session of the CSD 
Klaus Töpfer from Germany chaired the second session of the CSD, 
which was held from 16 to 27 May 1994. The main issues to be adopted 
were: decisions on chemical safety; requesting preparation of a Compre-
hensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the Worlds, to be 
submitted at CSD-5; calling for greater co-operation with governing 
bodies of international organizations, the Bretton Woods institutions and 
the General Agreement in Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and with major groups; the need for addi-
tional efforts in the areas of financial resources, transfer of environment-
ally sound technologies, co-operation and capacity-building to support 
the implementation of Agenda 21; and the need for additional measures 
to be taken to change contemporary patterns of consumption and produc-
tion (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 25f; Chasek 2000: 381, 385; UN 1994).  
Concerning decisions made regarding the CSD’s working methodology, 
Chasek (2000: 381) notes that ‘delegates widely acknowledged the need 
for effective intersessional work to prepare for the next session of the 
Commission, and the CSD took the decision to extend the mandate of the 
intersessional working groups’. Hence, it was agreed that one group 
would prepare for the CSD-3 discussion on land resource issues, and one 
group would focus on finance and technology transfer. Other decisions 
related to the working methodology were that the delegates emphasized 
the importance of the continuous exchange of information on practical 
experience gained by countries, organizations and major groups; the need 
for more simplified reporting procedures; the ongoing work on develop-
ing sustainable development indicators that could supplement national 
reporting; and the need for a dialogue-oriented approach, including the 
use of panel discussions and other means by which information could be 
shared and the experience of wide range of actors could be sought 
(Chasek 2000: 381). As noted by ENB (1994a), ‘the use of panel discus-
sions during the High-Level Segment was a great success’. The panels 
fostered a dialogue between the parties, such as experts, diplomats, politi-
cians and NGOs, on issues like finance and the role of women in relation 
to sustainable development. 
One of the major discussions among actors was related to the issues of 
national reporting and the development of indicators. Most countries 
agreed that the reporting procedures needed to be simplified. However, 
the states failed the attempt to adopt a decision on indicators due to 
opposition from the G-77/China Moreover, the discussions between 
North and South on the issues of financial resources and technology 
transfer continued as before. (ENB 1994a; 1994b).  
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4.1.3 The Third Session of the CSD 
Prior to the third session of the CSD, two ad hoc open-ended working 
groups were held, one on sectoral issues and one on finance. One of the 
most important issues to be noted was regarding the discussion at the 
working group on finance, as the delegates were presented a matrix of 
financial instruments and policy options. The question of how to finance 
the implementation of Agenda 21 has proven to be the most difficult 
issue to solve. Hence, the matrix presented at the meeting contained 
various suggestions on new, innovative and alternative ways and means 
to finance sustainable development to be discussed by the delegates 
(ENB 1995a).  
Henrique Cavalcanti from Brazil had been elected as Chair for third ses-
sion of the CSD, which was held from 11 to 28 April 1995. As highlight-
ed by Bigg and Dodds (1997: 26), more than 50 ministers and secretaries 
of state attended CSD-3. Some of the most important decisions made at 
this year’s session was; the establishment of an Inter-Governmental Panel 
on Forests (IPF) which would report to UNGASS in 1997; the establish-
ment of an ad hoc open-ended working group on consumption and 
production; and a timetable for the formulation of sustainable develop-
ment indicators (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 27). The Commission also called 
for a review of the mechanisms for transferring environmentally sound 
technologies; agreed to continue with dialogue sessions and panel discus-
sions; recognized the need to analyze the potential effects of environ-
mentally related trade issues; recognized that poverty eradication is an 
indispensable requirement of sustainable development; and encouraged 
initiatives at the national and international levels, including action to 
phase out the use of leaded gasoline (Chasek 2000: 382). 
As the sectoral issue of forest was on the CSD-3 agenda, the discussion 
on forests took centre stage. An idea of establishing IPF, proposed by the 
ad hoc working group on sectoral issues, were supported by a number of 
countries. However, some countries were concerned that the panel would 
be used as an instrument by interested parties to push the idea of a global 
convention on forest management. In the end, the delegates agreed to the 
establishment of the panel, whose objectives was to promote the imple-
mentation of UNCED forest decisions at the national and international 
levels (Agarwal et al. 2001: 185). The discussion that affected CSD-3 the 
most, however, was related to the issue of finance. Even though the Com-
mission achieved some important accomplishments at its third session, 
the question of how to finance sustainable development efforts remained 
as one of the continuing areas of concern. The G-77/China stressed the 
need to mobilize new and additional financial resources to support sus-
tainable development efforts and expressed concern about decreasing 
ODA levels (ENB 1995b). While some of the developed countries, such 
as Norway, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, supported the request 
for mobilizing new and additional financial resources, most of the North-
ern states, like the US, the EU and Australia, emphasized other funding 
sources than ODA, such as domestic resources and the use of economic 
instruments. The G-77/China opposed most of the proposals related to 
domestic resources and economic instruments, and called for deletion of 
the paragraphs that dealt with these matters (ENB 1995c). However, 
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proposals related to domestic resources and economic instruments, as 
well as references to the decline of the ODA in absolute terms, were 
included in the final document (UN 1995). 
4.1.4 The Fourth Session of the CSD 
The fourth session of the CSD, chaired by Bulgarian Rumen Gechev, met 
from 18 April to 3 May 1996. Gechev opened the session by noting the 
important role of CSD-4 in finalizing the Multi-Year Programme of 
Work and serving as a bridge to the preparations for UNGASS in 1997 
(ENB 1996a). However, the focus of the next year’s review of progress at 
CSD-5 and UNGASS provided a backdrop to many of the discussions at 
CSD-4 (ENB 1996b).  
The Commission endorsed the Global Plan of Action on protecting the 
marine environment from land-based activities; urged governments to 
pilot the 126 indicators developed by the CSD Secretariat in conjunction 
with governments, UN agencies, and major groups; reviewed the imple-
mentation of the Programme of Action (POA) for the Sustainable Devel-
opment of Small Island Developing States (SIDS); and addressed the 
relationship between the WTO provisions and trade measures for envi-
ronmental purposes, including those relevant to multilateral environ-
mental agreements (Chasek 2000: 382; UN 1996).  
Since the forth session of the CSD was dominated by preparation for the 
upcoming CSD-5 and UNGASS, CSD-4’s treatment of the sectoral issues 
was superficial. This concerned especially the issue of oceans (Agarwal 
et al. 2001: 185). One of the issues that attracted the most discussion by 
the Commission was participation of major groups and NGOs to 
UNGASS. Even though most delegations supported involvement of 
NGOs and major groups in general, the states disagreed about the rules of 
participation of major groups to UNGASS. The EU proposed that 
ECOSOC should be invited to ensure the continuation of the Rio arrange-
ments regarding participation of major groups, and that the GA should be 
invited to ensure appropriate arrangements for the contribution of major 
groups to UNGASS and its follow-up. The US wanted to delete any 
reference to major group representatives in delegations to UNGASS, and 
objected to Canada’s proposal for supporting the recommendations 
agreed to at CSD-2 confirming ECOSOC Roster status of all the CSD 
NGOs, and inviting major group participation during the preparations for 
and at CSD-5 and in the 1997 Special Session. The G-77 suggested 
deleting the sub-paragraph urging governments to include major group 
representatives in their national delegations (ENB 1996c). However, the 
states finally agreed to adopt the decision to encourage governments to 
involve major group representatives in preparations for the 1997 review 
process and in national delegations to the CSD-5 and, as appropriate, to 
UNGASS (ENB 1996d). 
4.1.5 The Fifth Session of the CSD 
The fifth session of CSD, chaired by Dr. Mostafa Tolba from Egypt, 
could be described as a ‘PrepCom’ to UNGASS. The delegates prepared 
a comprehensive document to be adopted by UNGASS, and agreed that 
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although some progress had been made in terms of institutional develop-
ment, international consensus-building, public participation, and private 
sector actions, the global environment continues to deteriorate and the 
commitments in the UNCED agreements have not been fully implement-
ed. Furthermore, CSD-5 identified energy/atmosphere, freshwater and 
forests as emerging priority issues (Agarwal et al. 2001: 187; Chasek 
2000: 382). The states also considered the report of IPF on its fourth 
session. Regarding forests, several states, such as Portugal, France and 
Greece, advocated the establishment of an Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee (INC) to initiate a global forest convention. The EU, Finland, 
Canada and Germany among others supported an international conven-
tion on forests. Others, such as China, Australia, Colombia, India, Brazil 
and the US among others, preferred to create an intergovernmental forum 
on forests or some other arrangement. The matters were to be discussed 
further at UNGASS (ENB 1997b). 
4.1.6 UN General Assembly’s Special Session 
In 1997, five years after UNCED, the delegates reconvened in New York 
from 23 to 27 June to review the implementation of Agenda 21. Ambas-
sador Ismail Razali was elected President of UNGASS, and Mostafa 
Tolba, Chair of CSD-5, was elected as Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee of 
the Whole (ENB 1997c). As noted by Chasek (2000: 382) UNGASS 
‘served as a review and assessment of the work of the Commission, and 
how the UN system, governments, local authorities, NGOs and interna-
tional organizations were implementing key components of Agenda 21 
and moving toward sustainable development’.  
The two main documents to be adopted were a Statement of Commitment 
and a Programme for Further Implementation of Agenda 21. The Pro-
gramme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 included: A) 
Assessment of Progress made since UNCED; B) Implementation in 
Areas requiring Urgent Action; C) Means of Implementation; and D) 
International Institutional Arrangements (ENB 1997d). The delegates 
also agreed on the next five-year programme of work. 
Other decisions adopted by the states concerned the CSD’s future role, 
programme of work and methods of work, and called on the CSD to;  
• continue to provide a central forum for reviewing progress 
and for urging further implementation of Agenda 21;  
• carry out its work in such a manner as to avoid unnecessary 
duplication and repetition of work undertaken by other 
relevant forums;  
• make concerted efforts to attract greater involvement in its 
work of ministers and high-level national policy makers 
responsible for specific economic and social sectors;  
• continue to provide a forum for the exchange of national 
experiences and best practices on the area of sustainable 
development;  
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• provide a forum for the exchange of experiences on region-
al and subregional initiatives and regional collaboration for 
sustainable development;  
• establish closer interaction with international financial, 
development and trade institutions; and  
• strengthen its interaction with representatives of major 
groups (ENB 1997d). 
Concerning the discussion on the Programme for Further Implementation 
of Agenda 21, a deep concern was expressed that the overall trends for 
sustainable development were worse than in 1992. Moreover, the dele-
gates acknowledged that the implementation of the commitments in the 
UNCED and post-UNCED agreements, as well as others adopted before 
1992, remained to be carried out (ENB 1997e). Thus, UNGASS recom-
mended to improve implementation of Agenda 21 issues such as: fresh-
water, consumption patterns, poverty, forests, energy and transport. On 
the issue of freshwater, the delegates emphasized the urgent need to 
formulate and implement programmes for integrated watershed manage-
ment, strengthen regional and international cooperation for technology 
transfer, and financing integrated water resources programmes (Agarwal 
et al. 2001: 200). The issue of forests generated considerable debate, as 
the delegates disagreed on the various options for international arrange-
ments and mechanisms on forest management. The debate was led by the 
Netherlands and Germany, who strongly advocated a legally binding con-
vention on forests. This proposal was opposed by many of the Southern 
countries. In the end, the countries agreed to a recommendation on a 
continued intergovernmental policy dialogue on forests (Agarwal et al. 
2001: 200, 202). 
4.2 The Second Phase 
4.2.1 The Sixth Session of the CSD 
The sixth session of the CSD met from 20 April to 1 May 1998, and was 
chaired by Cielito Habito from the Philippines. The Commission adopted 
decisions concerning: a review of implementation of POA for the Sus-
tainable Development of SIDS; and an enabling financial framework that 
contributes to the promotion of private sector finance mobilization. The 
states also recognized the value of the interactive dialogue between in-
dustry, business, trade unions, NGOs, governments and international or-
ganizations in responsible entrepreneurship, corporate management tools, 
technology cooperation and assessment and industry and freshwater; and 
the need for partnerships with major groups (ENB 1998a).  
The two issues that dominated the discussions at CSD-6 were the econ-
omic theme of industry and freshwater management. Concerning the 
issue of industry, Habito noted in his opening speech that industry has a 
dominant role in sustainable development. He also pointed out that indus-
try could be the biggest source of funds for sustainable development, 
especially since the world has moved away from the Rio funding targets 
(ENB 1998b). A Stakeholder Dialogue between NGOs, industry, trade 
and government delegates was introduced for the first time to discuss the 
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issues of industry and freshwater, technology cooperation and assess-
ment, responsible entrepreneurship, and corporate management tools 
(ENB 1998c).   
Freshwater became the sectoral focus at CSD-6, as UNGASS had called 
for highest priority to be given to freshwater problems. The main debate 
concerned the question of whether water was an economic or a social 
good. While the Northern countries wanted water to be considered an 
economic good with social value, the Southern countries emphasized that 
water should be seen in a larger social context (Agarwal et al. 2001: 204). 
The Commission agreed to give priority to the social dimension of 
freshwater management, but also to give further attention to explicit 
linkages of socio-economic development, for equitable utilization and 
efficient freshwater allocation and use (UN 1998). 
4.2.2 The Seventh Session of the CSD 
Simon Upton from New Zealand chaired the seventh session of the CSD, 
which was held from 19 to 30 1999. CSD-7 attracted more high-level 
representation than ever before as 89 ministers and high-level govern-
ment officials were present. The Commission continued with the Multi-
Stakeholder Dialogues, and thus, held a four-session Tourist Segment 
with representatives from local authorities, trade unions, industry and 
NGOs and governments. Furthermore, the countries prepared for the UN 
General Assembly’s Special Session to review the Barbados Programme 
of Action for the Sustainable Development of SIDS (ENB 1999). The 
Commission also agreed to: establish an ad hoc open-ended intergovern-
mental group of experts on energy and sustainable development; a recom-
mendation that the GA establish an open-ended informal consultative 
process on oceans and seas; a resolution on voluntary initiatives and 
agreements; call for action on illegal, unregulated or unreported (IUU) 
fishing; and a recommendation that ECOSOC adopt a draft resolution of 
the expansion of the UN Guidelines on Consumer Protection to include 
sustainable consumption (ENB 1999).  
Some of the main issue to be discussed by the states at CSD-7 concerned: 
oceans and seas, consumption and production patterns, and voluntary 
initiatives by stakeholders. Concerning oceans and seas, the delegates 
discussed the problem areas of by-catch, destructive fishing practices, and 
IUU fishing. Indonesia and Madagascar pointed out that the subsistence 
of small-scale fishermen was often affected by industrialised fishing 
fleets and by IUU fishing. Nigeria and France called on the CSD to give 
priority to the issue of IUU fishing (Agarwal et al. 2001: 206). The Com-
mission decided to recommend that the GA would establish an open-
ended informal consultative process to take account of the inputs pro-
vided by UN bodies and major groups (UN 1999). 
Finally, it is important to note the contribution of Chair Simon Upton to 
the negotiation process as he introduced a number of innovations such as 
video conferencing for Bureau meetings and including the identification 
of areas of non-agreement in the CSD-7 text (ENB 1999). 
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4.2.3 The Eighth Session of the CSD 
Juan Mayr Maldonado from Colombia chaired CSD-8, which was held 
from 24 April to 5 May 2000. The agenda for the delegates of the CSD-8 
were considered as very difficult as they were going to work out deci-
sions regarding the cross-sectoral theme of finance, trade and investment, 
and the sectoral theme of sustainable agriculture and land management. 
The conclusions and proposals in the final report of the Intergovern-
mental Forum on Forests (IFF) were also to be discussed, as were 
preparations for Earth Summit (Rio + 10) in 2002 (ENB 2000).  
Four Multi-Stakeholder Dialogues were held at this year’s session on the 
issues of production techniques, consumption and safety; best practices in 
land resources management; knowledge for a sustainable food system; 
and globalization, trade liberalization and investment patterns. Included 
for the first time were a number of experts who initiated thematic dis-
cussions at the High-level Segment. The delegates adopted decisions on: 
preparations for the ten-year review of UNCED; an invitation to 
ECOSOC and the GA to act on the proposed terms of reference for an 
international arrangement on forests, as recommended by IFF; and the 
report from the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Energy 
for Sustainable Development, which is preparing the energy agenda for 
CSD-9 (ENB 2000).  
Due to the difficult agenda of CSD-8, the states had to discuss issues 
involving strong political agendas. According to ENB (2000), these 
debates involved ‘the aim of consolidating politically contentious issues 
that are being addressed in other forums’. The Commission focused on 
such issues as: good governance; the relationship between multilateral 
environmental agreements and the WTO; the removal of subsidies in 
developed countries; references to common but differentiated responsi-
bilities and the precautionary principle; and the inclusion of references to 
‘legal’ security of tenure and ‘equal access’ to land to all people. As 
noted by ENB (2000) ‘some of the most protracted negotiations related to 
text on concepts that could be used as a cloak for protectionism’. Due to 
much disagreement, most of the decisions adopted on sectoral issues were 
watered down recommendation (Agarwal et al. 2001: 208). 
A much less contentious issue to be discussed by the delegates at CSD-8 
was on forests. Forests appeared on the agenda because IFF presented its 
final report to the CSD. As there was hardly any debate on the matters, 
the IFF report was adopted in two hours. The delegates also endorsed the 
report’s main proposal that a new UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) would 
be created. ECOSOC was given the responsibility to work out the 
modalities (ibid.). 
4.2.4 The Ninth Session of the CSD 
The ninth session of the CSD took place from 16-28 April 2001, and was 
chaired by Bedrich Moldan from the Czech Republic. After considera-
tions of the agenda and organizational matters, four Multi-stakeholder 
Dialogues were held on; equitable access to sustainable energy; produc-
ing, distributing and consuming energy; public-private partnerships to 
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achieve sustainable development; and sustainable transport planning. The 
scientific and technological community participated in the dialogues as a 
major group for the first time. Also, ministers and heads of delegations 
held several informal exchanges with the nominated CSD-10 Bureau 
members to provide political guidance on the preparatory process of 
WSSD scheduled to take place in Johannesburg in 2002 (ENB 2001a).  
The discussions at CSD-9 were strongly affected by substantive disagree-
ments related to matters such as: the use and transport of nuclear energy, 
sustainable development indicators, climate change and the Kyoto Proto-
col (ENB 2001a). Regarding the discussion on atmosphere, the rejection 
of the Kyoto Protocol by the US president George Bush in March 2001 
received strong reactions from many of the other delegates (ENB 2001b). 
In the end, the debates did not result in any firm resolutions on the issues 
of the CSD-9 agenda. However, it was a clear consensus among the 
parties that it was time to ‘radically restructure’ the CSD. According to 
ENB (2001a) ‘for many observers, CSD-9 was about preserving sover-
eign interests and narrowing down options for consideration at the 2002 
Summit, rather than engaging in frank discussions on sustainable devel-
opment with the goal of developing specific policy-oriented recommend-
ations’.  
4.2.5 The Tenth Session of the CSD (PrepCom-1) 
CSD-10, acting as the first PrepCom for WSSD, was held from 30 April 
to 2 May 2001. The delegates elected Emil Salim from Indonesia as 
PrepCom Chair. The Commission adopted decisions on: progress in 
WSSD preparatory activities at the local, national, regional and interna-
tional levels; modalities of future PrepCom sessions; tentative organiza-
tion of work during the WSSD; provisional rules of procedure; and 
arrangements for accreditation and participation of Major Groups (ENB 
2002). 
4.3 Summery of the Decision-Making Process 
With the tenth session of the CSD, the first ten years of the Commission 
were then completed. Summing up, it would be reasonable to say that the 
decision-making process of the CSD has had its ups and downs. The 
process had a slow start as the first substantive session dealt mostly with 
organizational issues. Also, the Commission did not make much progress 
at its second session, as the delegates were most concerned of issues 
related to the working methodology. CSD-3, however, has been high-
lighted due to the Commission’s efforts of getting forests on the agenda. 
At the next two sessions, the progress on the work of the CSD slowed 
down because the countries started preparing for UNGASS. UNGASS 
represented a lowpoint for the parties involved in the work on sustainable 
development, as the delegates acknowledged that the overall trends for 
sustainable development were worse than in 1992, and that the commit-
ments in the UNCED and post-UNCED agreements remained to be 
carried out. With that in mind, the countries started the second five-year 
period of the CSD. At CSD-6 and CSD-7, the Commission made great 
progress, both because the multi-stakeholder dialogues were introduced, 
and because freshwater and oceans were put on the agenda. The CSD did 
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not accomplish much at the next session, however, due to difficult issues 
such as trade, agriculture and finance. The last two sessions of the Com-
mission’s ten-year period were mostly affected by the countries’ attempts 
to positioning themselves and narrowing down options for consideration 
at WSSD in 2002. 
The presentation of the CSD’s decision-making process has focused on 
the most important decisions made and the main issues discussed by 
relevant parties during the ten-year period 1993-2001. I will now turn to 
the first part of my analysis, and thus, evaluate the accomplishments of 
the CSD compared to its mandate.  
5. To What Degree Has the CSD Achieved Its 
Goals? 
In order to answer the first question of my thesis, ‘to what degree has the 
CSD achieved its goals?’, it will be necessary to evaluate the degree of 
the CSD’s accomplishments. Thus, the aim of this chapter will be to 
measure the value of my dependent variable, ‘the CSD’s accomplish-
ment’. First, I will discuss some of the challenges of the CSD’s mandate 
concerning goal attainment. Second, I will examine the Commission’s 
accomplishments compared to its mandate. Finally, some comments re-
garding the measurement of the CSD’s accomplishments will be made, 
before I will determine the score of the dependent variable and give an 
answer to the first part of my thesis. 
5.1 The CSD’s Mandate and Goal Attainment 
As presented in chapter 3, the CSD was given a very broad mandate and 
programme of work. Thus, the CSD has some challenges concerning goal 
attainment. In broad terms, the mandate consists of three major goals: 
• monitoring and reviewing progress on the implementation 
of Agenda 21; 
• elaborating policy guidance and options for future initia-
tives aimed at achieving sustainable development; and 
• promoting dialogue and building partnerships for sustain-
able development between governments, the international 
community, and major groups (Chasek 2000: 383ff; UN 
1993b). 
Concerning goal attainment, four major challenges can be pointed out. 
First, as the formulation of the CSD’s mandate was broad and vague, the 
goals of the CSD have not been clear. This has lead to deliberations on 
issues addressed in other fora and to general, non-specific recommenda-
tions (Wagner 2003: 8). Second, the CSD was charged to monitor and 
review the progress on the implementation of Agenda 21 and activities 
related to the integration of environmental and development goals 
through analysis and evaluation of reports from governments, NGOs and 
other UN bodies, including commitments related to the provision of 
financial resources and transfer of technology (UN 1993b). Yamin 
(1998/99: 53) notes that ‘not counting NGO input, an educated guesti-
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mate might be somewhere between 400 and 500 entities, which might 
produce the same number of reports annually’. Thus, the task of monitor-
ing and reviewing can be considered enormous. Third, evaluating the 
implementation of Agenda 21 is problematic due to the lack of a ‘base-
line’ for measuring performance. As noted by Yamin (1998/99: 56), most 
environmental treaties provide for a goal and some kind of quantified 
baseline against which national performance can be assessed: ‘both the 
multiple goal and wide-ranging nature of Agenda 21 would appear to 
preclude such an approach’. Finally, Agenda 21 is not legally binding and 
does not contain any obligations for the states (Agarwal et al. 2001: 171; 
Eidheim and Hofseth 2005 [interview]). Moreover, according to Dodds et 
al. (2002a: 4), ‘the mandate of the Commission and the structure of the 
Secretariat make it clear that the CSD is intended to be a ‘soft forum’ in 
that it does not itself have the authority to develop new multi-lateral 
agreements’. Also, the CSD is not a legal authority and lack mandatory 
powers. Therefore, the CSD’s mandate does not oblige states and others 
to submit information to the Commission (Yamin 1998/99: 53ff). Since 
the CSD does not have any mechanism to hold governments accountable, 
it weakens the CSD’s impact on the international community and national 
governments (Wagner 2003: 4).  
Following this, the CSD has had a difficult starting point for goal attain-
ment. However, in order to measure the score of the dependent variable, I 
will examine the Commission’s accomplishments regarding the three 
major goals noted above. 
5.2 The CSD’s Accomplishments 
5.2.1 Monitoring and Reviewing Progress on the Implementation of 
Agenda 21 
As noted, the reporting process on the implementation of Agenda 21 is 
voluntary for the states and others. However, according to Agarwal et al. 
(2001: 183), ‘as far as the actual record of eliciting reports from national 
governments goes, CSD has been successful’. Eighty out of 114 countries 
that reported to the CSD during the period 1993-1997 did so on more 
than one occasion (Yamin 1998/99: 54). Also, 105 out of 149 countries 
submitted reports to the CSD more than once during the period 1998-
2002.13 Yamin (1998/99: 54) states that ‘in fact when the track record of 
developing countries alone is looked at, the CSD’s achievements seem 
extraordinary high, with the overwhelming majority of developing coun-
tries, including the least developed among them, having reported at least 
once’.  
However, due to the voluntary nature of the national reports, the CSD 
organizational session of 1993 decided that ‘it will be up to governments 
to decide on [the] degree of detail and regularity’ of information sub-
mitted to the CSD (UN 1993c). Thus, as noted by Yamin (1998/99: 54), 
‘in keeping with their voluntary nature, the content, format and timing of 
reports is ultimately for governments to determine’. At the first session of 
the CSD, the Commission’s lack of mandatory authority to determine 
these matters led to intense discussions (Yamin 1998/99: 54). In a final 
resolution, the governments agreed to accept several suggestions given by  
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Table 5.1: Number of National Reports Received by the CSD 
Year Total number 
of reports 
Number from 
developed nations 
Number from 
developing nations 
Number from 
economies in transition1 
19922 
19943 
1995 
1996 
19974 
19985 
1999 
2000 
2001 
20026 
154 
53 
59 
41 
97 
56 
60 
74 
53 
141 
22 
22 
23 
20 
24 
121 
27 
34 
19 
65 
11 
4 
2 
2 
8 
Notes14 
1. Using the Annex 1 listing from the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Several countries have reported to the CSD which are not 
parties to the FCCC and therefore may fall under this heading, such as: 
Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Uzbekistan. These countries have been counted here as developing. 
2. 1992 reports were submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development over the Period 1991-2. 
3. There were no reports for the year 1993 as this was the CSD organi-
zational year. 
4. 1997 national reports were in the form of ‘National Profiles’. 
5. The figures of national reports 1998-2002 are only as total numbers. 
6. 2002 reports were in the form of ‘Country Profiles’. 
Source:15 1992 figures from INTERAISE (1996), World Directory of Country 
Environmental Studies, May; 1994-7 figures from Mary Pat Silveira, United 
Nations Division for Sustainable Development, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (1997); 1998-2002 figures from Hiroko Morita-Lou, United 
Nations Division for Sustainable Development, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (2005).  
 
the Secretary-General, concerning the format and timing of reports (UN 
1993c) [emphasis by author]. However, as pointed out by Chasek (2000: 
384), the reporting guidelines proved to be too vague to facilitate a com-
prehensive reporting process. Thus, the delegates at CSD-2 and CSD-3 
emphasized the need for more simplified reporting procedures and 
ongoing work on developing sustainable development indicators in order 
to achieve more concise reports for future sessions (Bigg and Dodds 
1997: 26; Chasek 2000: 381). As a consequence, the Commission started 
a streamlining process of national reporting. One of the attempts of 
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streamlining was to introduce country profiles that were compiled by the 
CSD Secretariat by using all past reports. These profiles were then sent to 
their respective governments for updates and corrections (Yamin 
1998/99:55). At CSD-5, the Secretary-General recommended that the 
countries should update the profiles on an annual basis. He also 
recommended that national reporting should continue, but only on those 
issues on which the states did not report to other fora or bodies. (Yamin 
1998/99: 56). Yamin (ibid.) notes that ‘since UNGASS, the CSD has kept 
the country profiles on file so that much of the general information will 
not have to be repeated on a yearly basis’. However, many of the 
countries, especially the developing countries, still complain about too 
much reporting to the various UN bodies. They stress that they do not 
have the capacity to report to all bodies of the UN (Mabhongo 2005 
[interview]). According to Mabhongo (ibid.), the main reason for the 
reporting strains is the lack of coordination within the UN to share 
information. Hence, streamlining of the national reporting still needs 
improvement.  
Also, there are several problems concerning the use of self-reporting. 
First, the contents of the reports are difficult to compare (Zhu and Morita-
Lou 2005 [interview]). Since the CSD does not have any ‘baseline’ for 
measuring performance, many of the reports are based on estimates rather 
than on statistically exact data, and much of the information reported is of 
a qualitative nature (Yamin 1998/99: 56; Chasek: 2000: 384). Finding 
ways to measure progress on the implementation of Agenda 21 has prov-
en to be a continuous problem. As a response, the CSD has worked on 
developing indicators. The Commission adopted a decision at CSD-4, 
urging governments to pilot the 126 indicators developed by the Secre-
tariat in conjunction with the governments (UN 1996). This could be 
considered as a major progress, as many states had opposed the use of 
indicators at UNCED. According to Chasek (2005 [interview]) the CSD 
has done a good job developing indicators. The problem, however, is that 
many of the countries do not have the data and the statistical information 
to use indicators (ibid.) Consequently, the use of indicators has not 
functioned as well as intended (Skåre 2005 [interview]). 
Second, a widespread use of self-reporting also raises a general question 
of the reliability of the reports (Chayes and Chayes 1995 in Yamin 
1998/99: 56). The content has been hard to verify, and thus, the accuracy 
has been uncertain. However, Yamin (1998/99: 56) points out that syste-
matic falsification is rare, while non-reporting or provision of incomplete 
information is a more typical state reaction. Eidheim and Hofseth (2005 
[interview]) note that, especially concerning certain issues such as the 
climate, the states do not wish to give any information on the matters in 
the reports. Furthermore, many of the states tend to make their imple-
mentation performance look good, or perhaps better than in practice 
(Yamin 1998/99: 56).  
An additional problem concerning self-reporting is that the reports vary a 
lot: as some countries have followed the reporting guidelines, others just 
report on what they plan to do; and the reports are not always linked to 
the issues to be discussed at the sessions (Bergesen and Botnen 1996: 53; 
Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]). Following this, the national re-
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ports that have been submitted are of uneven quality, of uncertain accura-
cy, and difficult to compare. According to Bergesen and Botnen (ibid.), 
‘the summaries produced by the Secretariat are based on insufficient 
coverage and are presented in such general terms that it is impossible to 
draw meaningful conclusions about policy relevance from them. Hence, 
they appear to play a marginal role when the Commission meets’. 
Eidheim and Hofseth (2004 [interview]) note that significance of the 
national reports at the sessions has declined during the ten-year period 
1993 - 2002. 
However, the reporting process receives credit for strengthening coordin-
ation and dialogue between government agencies and between them and 
major groups, and that the report preparation process has served as a good 
starting point for their preparation for the annual CSD session (DESA 
2002 in Wagner 2003: 14). Moreover, Mabhongo (2005 [interview]) 
notes that national reporting is a useful mechanism to get firsthand 
information from the states, instead of getting the information from other 
sources. Wagner (DESA 2002 in Wagner 2003: 14) points out that ‘some 
countries indicate that the reports provide a tool for awareness-raising 
and internalization of the concept of sustainable development’. Thus, it 
appears that the national reporting has been useful for the states. 
Furthermore, as pointed out by Yamin (1998/99: 57), ‘the Secretary-
General’s conclusions about the reporting process contributing to the 
inward and outward processes would appear to be well founded’.  
5.2.2 Developing Policy Recommendations 
According to Chasek (2000: 385), the CSD’s record in elaborating policy 
guidance and options for future activities to follow up UNCED and 
advancing the sustainable development agenda is a mixed one. As noted 
earlier, the CSD is not a legislative authority, and has not got the mandate 
to make legally binding agreements for the states. Thus, the Commis-
sion’s task on policy guidance is limited to passing resolutions which 
‘recommend’ and ‘urge’. The Secretariat notes that the aspect of policy 
guidance has not been clear during the period 1993-2002, and therefore, 
the strong policy guidance has been deluded (Zhu and Morita-Lou 
[interview]). As pointed out by Wagner (2003: 14), ‘many have ques-
tioned the value of annually documenting the international consensus on 
each agenda item when, in most cases, that consensus ends up rehashing 
other agreements or otherwise settling for a lowest common denomin-
ator’. However, the agenda-setting role of the CSD has been highlighted 
by many. As noted by Eidheim and Hofseth (2005 [interview]), the CSD 
puts issues on the agenda and initiates processes that continue into other 
fora. Mabhongo (2005 [interview]) notes that the Commission has kept 
people talking about various issues, and therefore kept the issues on the 
agenda. Thus, there are some areas where the CSD has had some success 
in policy guidance. The main areas that have been highlighted are: 
forests, oceans and freshwater.  
In order to follow up the Forest Principles from Rio, the CSD was to 
discuss the issue of forests at its third session in 1995. The delegates 
agreed to establish IPF to formulate options for action to support the 
management, conservation, and sustainable development of all types of 
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forests and report back to the CSD in 1997 (Chasek 2000: 382). Accord-
ing to Chasek (ibid.), this decision was seen by many as a watershed 
event that has helped to focus the international dialogue on forest, and its 
‘deliberations built international consensus and formulated approaches 
for action on the majority of issues under consideration’. In 1997, the IFF 
replaced the IPF due to a recommendation by UNGASS to continue the 
intergovernmental policy dialogue on forest. Chasek (2005 [interview]) 
notes that both fora came up with a lot of good recommendations, but the 
dialogue on forests needed to be carried out on a higher level. At CSD-8, 
the delegates were to discuss conclusions and proposals in the final report 
of the IFF. They agreed to an invitation to ECOSOC and the GA to act on 
the proposed terms of reference for an international arrangement on 
forests, as recommended by the IFF. Thus, the UNFF was then estab-
lished. Chasek (2005 [interview]) points out that this shows that when the 
CSD makes a recommendation, it is not necessarily ignored. 
Another recommendation by the CSD that was acted on was to establish a 
consultative process on oceans (Chasek 2005 [interview]). When the 
issue of oceans and seas was on the agenda at CSD-7, the delegates 
agreed on a recommendation to the General Assembly to ‘establish an 
open-ended consultative process’ to take stock of the inputs provided by 
UN bodies (ENB 1999). The resulting UN Open-Ended Informal Consul-
tative Process on Oceans, together with the Law of the Sea, was then 
intended to facilitate deliberations in the GA on developments in oceanic 
affairs and to strengthen international coordination and cooperation in the 
area of oceans and seas (Wagner 2003: 15). As noted by Hyvarnien and 
Brack (2000 in Wagner 2003: 15), this process ‘may contribute to 
revitalising the Assembly’s oceans debate’. 
The issue of freshwater has also been highlighted as a success story of the 
CSD. At CSD-2, the CSD requested preparation of a Comprehensive 
Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the Worlds, to be submitted 
at its fifth session in 1997 (Chasek 2000: 385). According to Chasek 
(ibid.), ‘this assessment provides an overview of major water quantity 
and quality problems, with the aim of helping people understand the 
urgent need to deal with these issues before they become even more 
serious’. As a consequence of the assessment, the CSD decided to make 
freshwater a priority issue for the sixth session of the Commission. Since 
there has not been a body within the UN system for the issue of 
freshwater, the CSD has been important for putting freshwater on the 
agenda, and keeping it there. Mabhongo (2005 [interview]) points out 
that countries are still talking about the outcome of CSD-6, because they 
managed to treat the issue in an integrative manner, and discuss fresh-
water in terms of poverty and development. 
However, even though important issues have been put on the agenda 
within the CSD, a relevant question is asked by Chasek (2000: 385): ‘is 
the CSD having an impact outside of the UN basement?’ She points out 
that several NGOs believe that the CSD needs a more strategic process, 
including greater involvement of experts, national-level officials from the 
capitals, and stakeholders at the local level (ibid.). The CSD has been the 
most successful ECOSOC commission to attract NGOs, ministers and 
representatives from national capitals. However, as many of the delegates 
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from developing countries are diplomats from the permanent missions in 
New York, this has affected the decision-making process at the CSD 
sessions (Chasek 2000: 386). As noted by Chasek (ibid.), ‘the job of the 
diplomat is to negotiate, not always to understand the technical issues 
under negotiation’. As the diplomats do not always consult their capitals 
or the people who actually understand the various environmental and 
development issues, they do not necessarily have the knowledge to dis-
cuss the specific issues properly (Chasek 2005 [interview]). Consequent-
ly, the delegates who represent the developing countries, have often used 
general rhetorical statements in the discussions of the various issues 
(Eidheim and Hofseth 2005 [interview]). The CSD debates are therefore 
often characterized by North-South rhetoric, focusing on issues such as 
finance and technology transfer (Chasek 2000: 386). This also concerns 
the problem of disconnected cross-sectoral issues. As pointed out by 
Eidheim and Hofseth (2004 [interview]), many of the diplomats lack the 
understanding of the linkage between the issues of financial and technical 
transfer and the specific sectoral issues, and therefore do not discuss the 
matters in an integrative manner. Moreover, Agarwal et al. (2001: 172) 
point out that as the CSD has been treated as a negotiating forum by 
delegates, the CSD sessions have used to renegotiate decisions already 
settled in other international agreements. According to Brown (1998: 3), 
the negotiators often seem to be unaware of prior CSD decisions or the 
text of Agenda 21: ‘as a result, proposals are often made that invite 
endless discussion of abstract matters that have been carefully worked out 
in the past and for which no further political progress is likely’. Eidheim 
and Hofseth (2004 [interview]) have a different opinion as they claim that 
the delegates actively use their archives to recollect previous decisions. In 
their opinion, the renegotiations are just a proof of strategic attempts of 
‘replay’ (ibid.). 
Following this, the CSD has had some success of policy guidance as they 
have put issues on the agenda, and kept them there. However, as there 
have been several problems regarding the negotiations, the discussions 
carried out during the CSD sessions have resulted in few action-oriented 
proposals on how countries and the UN system can move further towards 
sustainable development (Agarwal et al. 2001: 172). 
5.2.3 Promoting dialogue and building partnerships for sustainable 
development16 
Achieving the goal of promoting dialogue and building partnerships for 
sustainable development between governments, the international com-
munity, and major groups is generally seen as the most successful accom-
plishment of the CSD. One of the main reasons for this, is that the CSD 
has been innovative in finding new ways to involve the major groups 
(Chasek 2005 [interview]).  
The degree of dialogue between governments and NGOs was significant 
already at the first session of the CSD, as NGO were given speaking slots 
at strategic points throughout all debates in the CSD plenaries, and to 
informal negotiations over specific policies and initiatives (Bigg and 
Dodds 1997: 24). At CSD-5, formal dialogue sessions between govern-
ments and each of the major groups were arranged for the first time 
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(Chasek 2000: 386). The Multi-stakeholder dialogues were introduced at 
CSD-6. This was considered an innovative approach by attempting to 
generate action-oriented dialogue between governments and major groups 
concerning a sector, such as agriculture or industry, or identifying future 
policies and action that would contribute to advancing the sustainable 
development objectives (Dodds et al. 2002b: 25). The Dialogues were 
also held at the next three sessions, and gained higher status as the 
outcomes were put on the table with Ministerial discussion and the CSD 
Intersessional documents for governments (Dodds et al. 2002a: 8).  
Even though achieving the goal of promoting dialogue and building part-
nerships for sustainable development is generally seen as the most 
successful accomplishment of the CSD, several problems can be noted. 
The Multi-Stakeholder Dialogues is not always seen as a success because 
the major groups have often been talking to themselves, and because not 
enough major groups from developing countries have been participating 
(Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]). Also, whilst the dialogues were 
interesting and useful in terms of information sharing, they did not have a 
clear impact on the intergovernmental process. As noted by Dodds et al. 
(2002a: 5), ‘the dialogues remained tied to the effectiveness of the chair 
to ensure that governments receive the conclusions of the dialogues’. One 
reason for this has been that many of the diplomats, who negotiate, do not 
attend the dialogues: ‘what they do is that they push the people from 
capitals into the dialogue sessions, while the diplomats go forth and 
negotiate’ (Chasek 2005 [interview]). Thus, the major groups have been 
concerned that their contributions to the dialogues do not have an impact 
on the actual decision-making process of the CSD. Dodds et al. (2002a: 
8f) notes that the mechanism of linking stakeholder contributions into the 
decision-making process is a shortcoming of the dialogues. The Secre-
tariat (Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]), however, state that the 
outcomes from the dialogues often serve as basis for negotiations.  
Even though the link between the multi-stakeholder dialogues and the 
negotiations may need improvement, the dialogues have been an import-
ant mechanism for building partnerships between relevant parties in the 
work on sustainable development. The partnership building within the 
CSD has also had an effect at national and local levels. The Local 
Agenda 21 movement that came out of UNCED has offered means for 
local action plans to be developed within a city or town to implement the 
Agenda 21 recommendations (Wagner 2003: 16f). Thus, the CSD has 
most likely contributed to enhanced dialogue and partnerships building 
between actors at international, national and local levels. 
5.3 The Degree of the CSD’s Accomplishments 
Even though the Commission has had a difficult starting point for goal 
attainment, several accomplishments can be noted. The CSD has received 
some credit for monitoring and reviewing progress on the implementation 
of Agenda 21, due to the contributions of the reporting process at interna-
tional and national level. The contributions that have been highlighted 
are: awareness-raising and internalization of the concept of sustainable 
development at national level; strengthening cooperation and dialogue 
between government agencies and between them and major groups; and 
The Commission on Sustainable Development 39 
 
various inward and outward processes of countries and stakeholders 
(DESA 2002 in Wagner 2003: 14; Yamin 1998/99: 14, 57; Zhu and 
Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]). The CSD has also had some success in 
policy guidance, especially concerning the issues of forests, oceans and 
freshwater. The agenda-setting role has been highlighted as the Commis-
sion has put issues on the agenda and kept them there, and initiated 
processes that have continued into other fora (Eidheim and Hofseth 2005 
[interview]). Finally, promoting dialogue and building partnerships for 
sustainable development between governments, the international com-
munity, and major groups is regarded as the CSD’s greatest accomplish-
ment, due to the innovative ways of involving NGOs and other major 
groups into the work of the Commission (Chasek 2005 [interview]). 
However, measuring the degree of CSD’s accomplishments is a difficult 
matter. Due to a broad and vague mandate, there is quite a lot of room for 
interpretation and evaluation of what the CSD actually has accomplished 
during ten years (Chasek 2000: 383). Chasek (2000: 379) notes that ‘the 
Commission is a different beast to everyone who is involved in or 
observes its work’. Thus, determining the score of the dependent variable 
depends on how the CSD’s accomplishments are evaluated and mea-
sured. First, one might attach different importance to the goals, when 
measuring the degree of achievements. Even thought it would have been 
a reasonable approach, I have still chosen to attach equal importance to 
all of the CSD’s goals. Second, one might have different expectations as 
to what the CSD should accomplish. It is therefore important to stress 
that the degree of the performances will be determined compared to the 
mandate of the CSD.  
In order to give a score to the dependent variable, several experts have 
been asked to consider the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments com-
pared to the CSD’s mandate on a scale of high, medium and low score.17 
Many of the respondents emphasized the difficulties of determining a 
score as they pointed out that the score was high in some areas, and low 
in other areas. They also pointed out the significance of how the mandate 
is interpreted. According to one respondent, the CSD has fulfilled its 
mandate, because the only obligation the Commission really has is to 
hold a meeting once a year. He claims, however, that the degree of ac-
complishments is low if you have a naïve reading of Agenda 21. Another 
respondent states that the environmental conventions have been more 
important than the CSD, because they show more results concerning 
behavioural and political changes. Thus, the CSD is given a low score 
due to the lack of obligations for the states. In the words of one respond-
ent, the degree of accomplishments ‘[...] is high in the sense of innova-
tion, low in terms of negotiated output. However, very high in the fact 
that [the CSD] is the place to be’. Following this, the final score given by 
the majority of the respondents was medium, as they summed up the 
scores in the various areas of the CSD’s accomplishments. However, it is 
important to be aware of the possibility that some of the respondents have 
either attached greater importance to one of the goals than the others, or 
given a score of the accomplishments based on their expectations rather 
than with regards to the CSD’s mandate. 
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Concerning my evaluation of the CSD’s accomplishments compared to 
its mandate, a final judgement of the goal attainment is: medium score on 
reviewing and monitoring the implementation of Agenda 21; low score 
on policy guidance; and high score on promoting dialogue and partner-
ships between relevant actors. Summing up, the score of the dependent 
variable is medium. Thus, when returning to the first question of my 
thesis, ‘to what degree has the CSD achieved its goals?’, the answer 
would be that the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments is medium. I will 
now continue with the second part of my thesis: ‘which mechanisms 
explain the CSD’s accomplishments?’ 
6. Which Mechanisms Explain the CSD’s 
Accomplishments? 
The main focus of this chapter will be the second part of my thesis: 
‘which mechanisms explain the CSD’s accomplishments?’ In order to 
give an answer to this question, the degree of the CSD’s accomplish-
ments will be explained by using three sets of explanatory variables: 
‘Institutional Design’, ‘Distribution of Capabilities’ and ‘Entrepreneurial 
Leadership’. I will first evaluate the variables regarding the assumptions 
presented in chapter 2, and then determine if the variables can provide 
significant explanations for the medium degree of the CSD’s accomplish-
ments.  
6.1 Institutional Design 
6.1.1 The Role of the Secretariat 
Concerning my proposition that an active, independent and financially 
strong secretariat will enhance the degree of the CSD’s accomplish-
ments, the intention here will be to analyze whether the CSD Secretariat 
can be regarded as an active, independent and financial strong secretariat 
or a financial weak assistant secretariat. As a starting point, it is important 
to note that the opinions of the role of the secretariat are divergent, both 
with regard to what role the CSD Secretariat should have, and what role it 
actually has had.  
Regarding the financial strength of the Secretariat, many have pointed out 
the lack of financial resources. According to Eidheim and Hofseth (2005 
[interview]), the Secretariat’s limited financial resources and technical 
equipment is a problem which is common for the UN system in general. 
The Secretariat (Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]) notes that the 
lack of financial resources has been a continuous problem, which has lead 
to difficulties when organizing expert meetings and other intersessional 
meetings. Moreover, the Secretariat has only been able to support 15-25 
representatives from developing countries to each session (Pietracci 2005 
[interview]). Many have also pointed out the Secretariat’s lack of 
manpower. Yamin (1998/99: 58) notes that ‘seven people sitting in an 
office in New York cannot be expected to access the accuracy and 
reliability of hundreds of reports each year and to tell others anything 
useful about them [...]’. Khor (1994: 103) points out that ‘by the time of 
the CSD session, a full year after the Rio Summit, the Secretariat had 
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only a handful of staff, and some of these had been “borrowed” from 
other departments’. However, it is important to stress that the manpower 
of the Secretariat has improved a lot since its establishment. The CSD 
Secretariat is budgeted for 60 persons, including the director, for 2005 
(Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]). Still, Ling and Khor (2001: 18) 
claim that ‘significantly more resources and appropriate personnel would 
be needed by the CSD secretariat to play [an] expanded and more 
dynamic role’.  
Even though the lack of financial resources have been a problem for the 
CSD secretariat, it has still received credit for its work of preparing 
comprehensive documentation, developing sustainable development indi-
cators, compilating national reporting information, and integrating the 
work and contributions of major groups into the CSD process (Chasek 
2000: 393). Due to learning effects, the secretariat has improved its 
capacity as it has increased the use of technology and has acquired more 
expertise than in the beginning (Chasek 2005; Leiro 2004 [interviews]). 
Also, according to one government representative (Hofseth in Eidheim 
and Hofseth 2005 [interview]), the secretariat has done a good job 
preparing and organizing the annual CSD sessions.  
Concerning the role of the CSD secretariat, it is important to point out 
that most secretariats are dependent to a certain degree, and therefore, the 
role of the secretariat should be determined regarding the degree of 
dependence. As the CSD’s placement is within ECOSOC, which again is 
placed under the GA, the secretariat was given a very dependent role by 
the states already at its establishment. The secretariat (Zhu and Morita-
Lou [interview]) notes that it has a dependent role because it is placed 
under DESA and thus, follows DESA’s rules and regulations in its 
work.18 Moreover, the secretariat stresses that the CSD first and foremost 
has a service-oriented role. Following this, the CSD secretariat was 
mandated to assist the countries and the chairmanship of the CSD (ibid.). 
However, the actual role of the secretariat has been more active than the 
mandate it was given.  
Eidheim and Hofseth (2004 [interview]) point out that the secretariat has 
self-interests, both in relation to the UN Environment Programme 
(UNEP) and to the Chair. First, there has been a conflict between 
UNEP’s goal, mandate and practice and the CSD secretariat, as the secre-
tariat wants to be the main body for for instance environmental issues. 
Second, the Chair has had to negotiate with the secretariat in order to get 
breakthrough for his ideas and proposals (ibid.). Eidheim and Hofseth 
(ibid.) point out that the reason for these negotiations is that the secre-
tariat has the experience of knowing which ideas and proposals that will 
be accepted by the states and coalition groups. However, as the secretariat 
is able to predict the various reactions from the countries, some self-
censorship has been practised by the secretariat. According to Eidheim 
and Hofseth (ibid.), the secretariat has been more cautious towards G-
77/China and the US than the EU, but in general the self-censorship has 
been practised regardless of the various countries. 
Summing up, the CSD secretariat was established as a very dependent 
assistant secretariat, with the main functions of providing administrative 
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assistance to the parties in document preparation, and collecting and com-
piling follow-up reports from the parties. The secretariat can also be 
regarded as financially weak. It would therefore be reasonable to assume 
that the secretariat has had limited impact on the CSD’s accomplish-
ments. However, as noted above, the actual role of the secretariat has 
been more active than the mandate it was given. Thus, the secretariat has 
been active to a certain degree in relation to the countries and the chair-
manship in the development of negotiation texts and protocols, due to its 
experience and expertise. Following this, my conclusion is that the CSD 
secretariat has enhanced the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments. 
6.1.2 The States’ Sector Representation  
Concerning my proposition that a broad and diversified sector represen-
tation of the states will enhance the degree of the CSD’s accomplish-
ments, the intention here will be to analyze whether the states’ sector 
representation can be regarded as broad and diversified or narrow. 
As noted earlier, it is important to integrate three main dimensions of 
environmental, social and economic issues in order to advance the sus-
tainable development agenda. Chasek (2000: 394) notes that ‘to be truly 
effective in setting the sustainable development agenda, the CSD must 
[...] attract and involve ministers of foreign affairs, finance, trade, agri-
culture, development or development assistance, forests, and so on’. 
However, while the CSD attracts many ministers each year, a continuous 
problem for the Commission during the period 1993-2001 has been that 
most of the ministers represent the environmental sector (ibid.). This has 
lead to two main problems for the CSD. First, since the CSD has primar-
ily attracted environmental ministers, the parties have given the most 
attention to the environmental agenda. Leiro (2004 [interview]) claims 
that this has been a cumulative development, as the environmental 
ministers has been in the driver’s seat when defining the CSD agenda, it 
has become less relevant for other ministers to attend the meetings. 
According to Dodds et al. (2002a: 5), the minimal participation by 
ministers with other portfolios than environment has served to further 
marginalize the debate at the sessions and limit the CSD’s impact and 
follow-up. Moreover, this has also affected the integration of develop-
mental and environmental aspects of sustainable development (Ling and 
Khor 2001: 17). 
Second, as the environmental ministers generally have less political influ-
ence than the ministers from finance, trade and industry, this has affected 
the CSD’s impact at national level (Agarwal et al. 2001: 173). Most 
often, the environmental ministers do not wield a lot of power in their 
home countries, and thus, do not have the influence needed for national 
implementation (Mabhongo 2005 [interview]). Khor (1994: 110) points 
out that the environmental ministers are in charge of ministries ‘whose 
views and budgets are generally given low priority compared to trade, 
commerce, and economics ministries. These are the ministries that are 
most closely linked to the dominant economic structures and institutions 
that are, to a large extent, responsible for environmental problems’. Thus, 
the states’ sector representation has been narrow, due to the limited parti-
cipation by ministers other than ministers with the environmental back-
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ground. Following this, my conclusion is that the states’ sector represen-
tation has caused a reduction in the degree of the CSD’s accomplish-
ments. 
6.1.3 Nonstate Actors’ Access and Participation 
Concerning my proposition that open and inclusive rules of access and 
participation of a large number of nonstate actors will enhance the 
degree of the CSD’s accomplishments, the intention here will be to 
analyze whether the access of nonstate actors has been inclusive or 
exclusive, and whether the participation of these actors can be regarded 
as broad or limited. 
The CSD is often seen as being at the forefront in involving NGOs and 
other major groups. Thus, the Commission has been regarded as pioneer 
within the UN system in its work of providing greater access for nonstate 
actors (Chasek 2005; Mabhongo 2005 [interviews]). Prior to UNCED, it 
was difficult for NGOs to access UN government delegates and to attend 
UN meetings. However, during the preparatory meetings of UNCED, 
NGOs and other major groups achieved greater access than before 
(Wagner 2003: 3). This process continued with the CSD as it was decided 
that the same NGOs that had been accredited with UNCED, would also 
gain accreditation with the CSD. The rules of access were actually en-
hanced at the first CSD session when compared to the UNCED process, 
due to help from the chairman Ismael Razali (Khor 1994: 112). As noted 
by Khor (ibid.), Razali ‘allowed NGO participants access not only to the 
plenary meetings but also to the informal negotiation-group sessions, 
which have normally been held behind closed doors. NGOs were invited 
to speak at all sessions, including the ministerial meeting, and sometimes 
were given precedence over government delegates’. The CSD also 
provided opportunities and access for other major groups into the work of 
the Commission. Following the Agenda 21 decree of major groups parti-
cipation, the CSD have continuously developed new ways of involving 
these groups at the sessions. At CSD-2, the major groups were able to ask 
their governments questions on their national presentations in front of 
their peer group (Dodds et al. 2002a: 8). The next year, CSD-3 introduced 
a ‘Day of a Major Group’, inviting the major group of local authorities to 
share national experiences on implementing Agenda 21. Similarly, a day 
of the workplace was held at CSD-4 (Agarwal et al. 2001: 196). From 
CSD-5 to CSD-9, formal dialogue sessions were held between 
governments and the major groups. This was seen as a significant step in 
institutionalizing major groups into the work of the Commission (Chasek 
2000: 386). In 1997, all major groups were given a slot in the Heads of 
State meeting of UNGASS, for the first time within the UN system. 
(Dodds et al. 2002a: 8). Moreover, the first PrepCom for WSSD, CSD-
10, had presentations by all nine major groups (ibid.). 
In general, governments have seemed open to major group participation 
at the CSD sessions (Agarwal et al. 2001: 197). However, as noted by 
Eidheim and Hofseth (2005 [interview]), some of the developing coun-
tries have been protesting against the participation of some of their 
national NGOs, saying that they are political organizations, and not 
nongovernmental organizations. Also, the access of nonstate actors has 
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been limited in the negotiation process. Pietracci (2005 [interview]) 
points out that the actual negotiations have been the sole prerogative by 
member states. Even though the access for nonstate actors is limited in 
some areas, the access has still improved greatly during ten years. 
Wagner (DESA 2002 in Wagner 2003: 3) notes that ‘in November 2001, 
the “CSD List”, which identifies the NGOs with consultative status for 
the UNCED follow-up process, listed approximately 3000 organizations’. 
The actual participation of nonstate actors has been highlighted as being 
of major importance for the work of the CSD. Eidheim and Hofseth 
(2005 [interview]) point out that NGOs and other major groups contribute 
to the democratization of the decision structure of the UN system in 
general. Concerning the CSD, the major groups have received credit for 
contributing to enhancing the quality of the decision-making process, to 
creating attention and pressure on governments, to initiating processes, to 
informing the member states and to pushing for policies (Leiro 2004; 
Pietracci 2005 [interviews]). According to Pietracci (2005 [interview]), 
the major groups have advocated for certain issues and have tried to 
influence the states, which is sometimes reflected in the output word-for-
word in paragraphs. However, she (ibid.) notes that the major groups 
have been quite dissatisfied at times with how they affected the output. 
Hence, there has been a concern that the governments do not actually 
listen to the major groups. As noted earlier, one reason for this is that the 
diplomats, who most often have the responsibility of negotiations, do not 
attend the dialogue meetings (Chasek 2005 [interview]). However, many 
claim that the major groups have been heard when they are well prepared, 
and when they have important technical knowledge (Eidheim and 
Hofseth 2005; Mabhongo 2005; Skåre 2005; Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 
[interviews]). Pietracci (2005 [interview]) points out that it is a limit to 
how much the member states can listen. As they have instructions from 
home, there are some constraints on the delegates from countries. In the 
word of one government representative, ‘all delegations from a country 
have a mandate, and you can not go round the mandate. [NGOs] have to 
lobby at home, before the mandate gets written’ (Hofseth in Eidheim and 
Hofseth 2005 [interview]). Chasek (2000: 387) notes that ‘instead of 
observing what is going on, reporting to their own constituencies, and 
trying to influence policy-makers at home, some major group 
representatives behave like UN diplomats and spend their time trying to 
influence the text under negotiation’. However, this problem has 
improved as many of the major groups have learned that a lot of 
advocacy work needs to be done at home (Hofseth in Eidheim and 
Hofseth 2005 [interview]). Thus, the participation of NGOs and other 
major groups in the CSD has also had some effect on the domestic 
agenda in some states. Chasek (2000: 386f) points out that ‘if the NGOs 
do not like what their government representatives are saying, they will 
report on this to their constituencies at home, who will in turn put 
pressure on the government to explain or even change its position’.  
Even though the rules of access have included more and more NGOs and 
other major groups into an increasing number of areas within the CSD, 
the actual participation has been irregular. First, for some groups, the 
CSD has attracted members of umbrella organizations instead of 
members from the groups (Chasek 2000: 387). Second, many of the 
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bigger and more representative NGOs do not attend the CSD because 
they do not take it seriously (Maier 2000 in Agarwal et al. 2001: 197). 
Third, there has not been enough participation of major groups from 
developing countries. As noted by Chasek (2000: 387), ‘many of them 
cannot afford to attend or are unaware of the importance of the CSD’. 
Thus, while NGOs from some of the Northern countries have been better 
informed and have often worked in close cooperation with their 
governments, NGOs from Southern countries have remained outsiders. 
Therefore, the view of the NGOs from developing countries has not often 
been adequately represented, especially not when writing a joint position 
paper (Agarwal et al. 2001: 198). According to Agarwal et al. (ibid.), 
there are two main reasons for the difficulties of Southern NGOs: 1) as 
many of the Southern governments have a top-down culture, there is no 
precedent for involving NGOs into decision-making; and 2) Southern 
governments often attend CSD sessions without clear positions issues, or 
portray any national interests. 
Summing up, the CSD has been at the forefront within the UN system of 
involving NGOs and other major groups into its work, even though 
several problems can be noted. Overall, however, the rules of access have 
been open and inclusive, and the participation of nonstate actors has been 
broad. Following this, my conclusion is that the nonstate actors’ access 
and participation have caused the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments 
to enhance. 
6.2 Distribution of Capabilities 
Concerning my propositions that if the most powerful actors act as push-
ers, the degree of CSD’s accomplishments will enhance, the intention 
here will be to evaluate the states’ interests and their positions, before the 
distribution of capabilities is explored. It is important to point out that as 
most states have used negotiating coalitions at the CSD, this evaluation 
will focus primarily on these coalitions. 
6.2.1 The Interests of States and Coalitions 
The European Union (EU) 
The EU, which consisted of 15 member states during most of the period 
1993-2001, has addressed sustainable development issues domestically 
for many years (Wagner 2003: 12).19 The coalition has had some prob-
lems with internal disputes, but has become a much more coordinated 
actor in global negotiations (Eidheim and Hofseth 2004; Skåre 2005 
[interviews]). The EU has a centralized bureaucracy in Belgium, where 
the states’ representatives develop common positions prior to most con-
ferences, including the CSD sessions (Wagner 1999: 113f). As pointed 
out by Wagner (2003: 12), this allows the coalition ‘to arrive at the CSD 
with relatively well prepared positions and alternatives and a “driving” 
strategy; it often presents action proposals rather than solely responding 
to other’s suggestions’. However, the internal decision-making process 
faces a common problem for many negotiation coalitions, that representa-
tives of ‘small’ countries have a limited ability to push their preferences 
compared with ‘big’ countries (Wagner 1999: 114). Most often, the EU 
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uses a problem solving behaviour (ibid.). Still, the position and priorities 
change some, depending on the issue and depending on who has the EU 
presidency. Thus, the issues and the presidency effects whether the EU is 
willing to compromise or if it takes the hard line (Chasek 2005 [inter-
view]). Regarding the EU’s main priorities, some have pointed out that 
the EU is more concerned with the environmental dimension than the 
other dimension (Mabhongo 2005 [interview]). According to Agarwal et 
al. (2001: 199), the EU wants a green image, but is not willing to part 
with the necessary resources. Concerning this, most of the EU countries 
have not fulfilled their commitment to reach the UN target of 0.7% of 
GNP for ODA (Agarwal et al. 2001: 221).20 
JUSCANZ 
The JUSCANZ group consists of Japan, the US, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand. Also, Norway, Switzerland and other non-EU OECD 
countries consult with this relatively unstructured group (Wagner 1999: 
114). The group members discuss the issues and their positions during the 
CSD sessions, but do not develop a consensus position to be presented by 
a single speaker (Wagner 2003: 12). As noted by Eidheim and Hofseth 
(2004 [interview]), the interests and positions of the group members are 
quite broad, with Norway and Switzerland in one wing, the US and 
Australia in the other, and Japan, Canada and New Zealand somewhere in 
the middle. According to Schei (2004 [interview]), the positions of 
Canada and New Zealand have changed during the 1990s, as they often 
used to share the same position as the Nordic countries before, they now 
more often cooperate with the US and Australia. Wagner (2003: 12) 
points out that ‘several of this group’s members have traditionally taken 
progressive environmental positions and have played mediating roles in 
international fora’.  
The US’s position, however, is a different matter. In general, the US 
counters others’ proposals more often than exploring options (Wagner 
1999: 114f). As pointed out by Mabhongo (2005 [interview]), the US has 
also been reluctant to take any commitments. He (ibid.) notes further that 
the US wants minimal negotiations as a way to avoid commitments. The 
US’s position has been affected a lot by domestic politics and consti-
tuency, and the negotiators are very much guided by instructions from 
home (Mabhongo 2005; Skåre 2005 [interviews]). They have mainly 
stressed economic interests, and thus, opposed any increase in financial 
aid21. Instead, the US has pushed for the mobilisation of domestic 
resources within developing countries and increased use of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) as a way to finance the implementation of Agenda 21 
for developing countries (Agarwal et al. 2001: 199; Chasek 2005 [inter-
view]). However, the US does not look upon the CSD as an arena to 
promote interests. Therefore, as pointed out by Chasek (ibid.), it has used 
the CSD as a place to explore and test proposals: ‘if they get some good 
feedback on proposals, they may want to launch the proposals elsewhere, 
where it matters’. 
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The Group of 77 and China 
The G-77/China consists of 132 developing countries from African, 
Asian, Latin American and Caribbean regions. Internally, the group has 
often had diverging interests, with the small island states on one side and 
the oil-producing states on the other. This group nonetheless most often 
presents a joint position by a single speaker at the CSD (Wagner 2003: 
11). According to Eidheim and Hofseth (2004 [interview]), the countries 
within the G-77/China realize that they are strong as long as they stand 
together and have one joint position. However, Wagner (1999: 113) notes 
that ‘the delegates do not have the time, resources, or a centralized 
bureaucracy comparable to the EU’s to prepare a joint position prior to 
the CSD sessions’. Thus, the G-77/China has many coordination meet-
ings during the sessions, which often leave the group members focused 
on their joint position because they lack time to develop alternatives or 
fall back positions (ibid.). Also, it is not possible to agree on all issues, 
which means that there is a range of issues that they do not have any 
opinion about. There are only a few issues that they manage to agree on. 
(Eidheim and Hofseth 2004 [interview]). According to Chasek (2005 
[interview]), the issues of financial and technology transfer are ‘the only 
thing the entire G-77 can agree on’. Thus, the industrialized countries’ 
commitment to reach the UN target of 0.7 % GNP for ODA has 
continuously been stressed by the G-77/China. Moreover, when they 
finally conclude on an issue, it is impossible for them to change their 
opinion. Thus, it is difficult for them to enter into compromises with 
other states (Eidheim and Hofseth 2004 [interview]). As noted earlier, 
another problem is that many of the G-77/China delegates are UN 
diplomats, because they tend to focus on the politics rather than the 
technical merits of the issues (Wagner 2003: 11). Moreover, their lack of 
capacity and understanding of complex issues handicap the negotiators 
and force them to fall back on making general statements and rhetorical 
remarks, especially regarding the issues of financial resources and 
technology transfer (Gupta 1997: 133 in Chasek 2002). The G-77/China 
is also affected by the chair of the group, which has a great role on 
deciding the positions and the main interests of the group (Zhu and 
Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]). Thus, it has been a problem for the CSD 
during the period 1997-2001, that most of the G-77/China chairs have 
been from the OPEC countries (Chasek 2005 [interview]).  
6.2.2 The Positions of States and Coalitions 
As mentioned earlier, the work of the CSD concerns a whole range of 
different issues. Thus, it is important to stress the difficulties determining 
the various positions in regard to the CSD, because the position depends 
a lot on the issue. Following this, some of the states and coalitions have 
had several positions, all according to the issue being discussed. 
The EU is often seen as a pusher regarding many environmental issues. 
As noted above, the EU have addressed sustainable development issues 
domestically for many years, and thus, have become a progressive actor 
on environmental issues in international negotiations (Skåre 2005 [inter-
view]; Wagner 2003: 12). Some of the issues that the EU has pushed for 
are; a forest convention, legally binding targets on greenhouse gas emis-
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sions, and renewable energy technology (Agarwal et al. 2001: 199). On 
other issues, the EU has had a more intermediate position, and then, has 
mediated some disputes between the US and the G-77/China (Wagner 
1999: 114). However, on some issues, especially on agriculture subsidies, 
it has not been willing to move, and thus, acted as a laggard (Chasek 
2005 [interview]). Moreover, on the issues of aid and financial transfer, 
the EU has acted as a laggard together with many of the other Northern 
states (Agarwal et al. 2001: 199).  
The positions within the JUSCANZ group have been very diversified. 
Norway, together with the Nordic states Denmark and Sweden, has often 
been given credit for acting as a pusher on environmental and develop-
mental issues. They are also the only countries, together with the Nether-
lands, that have achieved the UN target of 0.7 % GNP to ODA (Agarwal 
et al. 2001: 221). The US, on the other hand, is mainly regarded as a lag-
gard. It has not been willing to accept any commitments, especially not 
the target of 0.7 % GNP to ODA (Agarwal et al. 2001: 179; Mabhongo 
2005 [interview]). The other members of the group have changed their 
positions, according to the issues. As noted above, however, Canada and 
New Zealand have more often shared the same position as the US than 
they used to (Schei 2004 [interview]). 
Since the G-77/China is such a large group, their members have also had 
diversified interests and positions. At the CSD, however, they most often 
have a joint position. The G-77/China is mostly seen as a laggard, as the 
group members continuously have pushed for more aid for implementa-
tion of Agenda 21 and technology transfer. In general, they have been 
reluctant to accept any commitments as long as the Northern countries 
have not fulfilled their commitments on ODA and technology transfer 
(Chasek 2005 [interview]). However, the group is divided on the issues 
of climate change and energy. This has resulted in that the SIDS have 
acted as pushers, and OPEC countries have acted as laggards on these 
issues (Agarwal et al. 2001: 199f).  
6.2.3 Distribution of Capabilities  
The evaluation shows that the states’ interests determine the position the 
states have in the negotiation process. However, the distribution of capa-
bilities determines which states are the most powerful and have the 
potential for achieving actual breakthrough for their interests. As a start-
ing point, I will assume that the EU and some of the large developed 
countries within the JUSCANZ group are the most powerful, due to their 
possession of material resources. In order to determine which actors that 
have affected the CSD’s accomplishment, it is necessary to evaluate the 
actors’ positions in relations to their capabilities. 
As noted, the EU has had several positions within the CSD, depending on 
the issue. Concerning the most contentious issue of financial resources, 
the EU have not been willing (or able) to achieve the target of 0.7 % GNP 
to ODA for the implementation of Agenda 21, and thus, acted as a lag-
gard. However, The EU has acted as a pusher on several environmental 
and developmental issues. Still, in my opinion, it is uncertain if the EU 
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has been powerful enough to pursue its interests on these issues to such a 
degree that it has affected and enhanced the performances of the CSD. 
Regarding some of the large developed countries within the JUSCANZ 
group, the US and Australia have acted as laggards on most issues, while 
Canada and New Zealand have acted more as laggards in the later phase 
of the CSD than in the early phase. In my opinion, these states have been 
powerful enough to achieve actual breakthrough for their interests, due to 
their possession of material resources. Moreover, the evaluation of the 
decision-making process showed that these countries within JUSCANZ 
have most likely achieved a greater breakthrough for their interests than 
the EU. As noted in chapter 2, the states’ coalition size may also been 
significant for influence in the negotiations. When evaluating the differ-
ent coalition groups of the CSD, the G-77/ China is by far the largest 
group with 132 state members. Thus, it would be reasonable to say that 
also the G-77/China has been powerful enough to achieve breakthrough 
for its interests, due to its coalition size. Following this, my conclusion is 
that since these powerful states have acted as laggards, they have caused 
the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments to reduce. 
6.3 Entrepreneurial Leadership 
Concerning my proposition that if entrepreneurial leadership is exercized 
by individuals, the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments will enhance, 
the intention here will first be to evaluate the possible source for entrepre-
neurial leadership, that is, the space and needs for such leadership. 
Second, I will explore if one or several individuals have had the neces-
sary skills, energy and/or status to exercise such leadership. I will also 
decide if one or several of these individuals have actually acted as an 
entrepreneurial leader by performing any of the following tasks; a) 
designing substantive solutions that are politically feasible; b) designing 
institutional arrangements that are conductive to the development, adop-
tion, and implementation of effective solutions; and c) designing actor 
strategies that can be effective in introducing constructive cooperation. 
6.3.1 Space and Needs for Entrepreneurial Leadership 
As noted in chapter 2, the space and needs of entrepreneurial leadership is 
affected by the character of the problem, states’ interests and the distribu-
tion of capabilities and the institutional design. First, as the problem of 
sustainable development was considered malign, I assume that there is a 
need for an entrepreneurial leader within the CSD, but also that the space 
for leadership is limited (Underdal 2002: 33). Second, the evaluation of 
states’ interests and the distribution of capabilities showed that the most 
powerful states have acted as laggards. Therefore, it would be reasonable 
to assume that there is a need for entrepreneurial leadership, in order to 
enhance the degree of the CSD’s achievements. Third, concerning the 
institutional design, the role of the CSD secretariat has had some effect 
on the space for entrepreneurial leadership. Chasek (2005 [interview]) 
notes that the secretariat does not like to loose control, and is therefore 
restrictive with regards to giving away control to the CSD chairperson or 
others. Thus, I assume that the secretariat has limited some of the space 
for leadership. 
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6.3.2 Individuals’ Skills, Energy and Status, and the Entity They 
Represent 
The ability of an individual to act as an entrepreneurial leader is deter-
mined by their capabilities, that is, skills, energy and status. As the ener-
gy and status are often linked to the entity the individual represents, it 
would be necessary to point out the entity the individual act on behalf of. 
Following this, I expect that a leadership would be exercised by an 
individual representing the CSD Bureau or the secretariat, but possibly 
also other entities. 
Leadership by the Bureau 
The Bureau consists of the chair and four vice-chairs. Due to the chair’s 
formal position as a leader, I assume that possible entrepreneurial leader-
ship would be exercised by one of the chairs. In interviews, two names 
have most often been mentioned in regard to the exercise of entrepre-
neurial leadership: Ismael Razali from Malaysia and Simon Upton from 
New Zealand.22  
The Malaysian ambassador Ismael Razali had most likely a significant 
role in the formation process of the CSD, as he chaired all of the working 
groups dealing with the establishment of the Commission (ENB 1992a; 
ENB 1992c).23 He was approved as chair for the first substantive session 
of the CSD, and has been highlighted by many for being one of the most 
important chairs of the CSD (Chasek 2000: 380). It is therefore 
reasonable to say that Razali a reputation as an entrepreneurial leader. He 
has been given credit for being a very competent diplomat that knew his 
craft, and for being a tough politician due to the way he led the 
negotiations. It has also been stressed that he was innovative concerning 
the dialogue between participants and the involvement of nonstate actors. 
Khor (1994: 110) notes that ‘participants were asked not to make set-
piece speeches, but to have an open and free exchange; as a result, the 
discussions were more direct and frank than the normal diplomatic and 
cautious UN style’. Razali also helped to develop unprecedented access 
and involvement for nonstate actors. He allowed them access not only to 
the plenary meetings, but also to the informal negotiation-group sessions, 
which had normally been held behind closed doors (Bigg and Dodds 
1997: 24; Khor 1994: 112). Furthermore, he efficiently explored the 
possibilities for collective solutions, and worked with the purpose of 
obtaining agreements. The fact that he was from the South was also an 
advantage concerning the willingness of the Southern countries to 
cooperate. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Razali had both the skills 
and energy to act as an entrepreneurial leader. Regarding the means an 
entrepreneurial leader use in order to exercise leadership, this evaluation 
shows that he also, to a certain degree, performed the tasks which is 
accounted for. Following this, my conclusion is that Ismael Razali exer-
cised entrepreneurial leadership for the CSD, and therefore, caused the 
degree of the CSD’s accomplishments to enhance. 
The CSD-7 chair, Simon Upton from New Zealand, is most often pointed 
out as the most significant chair during the second phase of the CSD. He 
has also been given credit for bringing new energy into the Commission. 
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Thus, Upton had a reputation as an entrepreneurial leader, due to both his 
formal position as chair and his reputation for leadership. He had the 
benefit of being the first chair to be elected a year in advance, and used 
this year to establish important one-on-one relationships with ministers 
prior to the session. As Upton was determined to achieve a more relevant 
and focused debate at CSD-7, he conducted a series of visits to capitals 
and prepared the ground for procedural changes. He also introduced a 
number of innovations such as video conferencing for Bureau meetings, 
and thus, made it easier for developing countries to participate at these 
meetings (ENB 1999). Following this, it can be noted that CSD-7 
attracted more high-level representation than ever before (ibid.). At the 
session itself, Upton encouraged the states to engage in dialogues, and 
told them to stay away from prepared statements. According to ENB 
(1999), Upton had ‘a backup plan to continue circumventing any attempt 
by delegates from the New York missions to return to the old ways, by 
working the phones behind the scenes, making use of a list of direct 
telephone numbers collected during his ministerial tête-à-têtes’. Also, 
ENB (ibid.) notes that he encouraged the negotiators to place their failure 
to agree on important issues on record in the CSD-7 text on Oceans and 
Seas: ‘Upton preferred to celebrate this frankness rather than support the 
Commission’s tradition of protracted negotiations leading to a lowest 
common denominator agreement’. Furthermore, he improved the multi-
stakeholder dialogues by involving more major groups. This review 
shows that Upton was able to act as an entrepreneurial leader, due to his 
skills and energy, but also his status. It will also be reasonable to say that 
he performed the necessary tasks to a certain extent. Thus, my conclusion 
is that Simon Upton exercised entrepreneurial leadership for the CSD, 
and therefore, caused the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments to 
enhance. 
Leadership by the Secretariat 
It would be reasonable to assume that a possible leadership would be 
exercised by any of the two secretariat directors the CSD had during the 
period 1993-2001, due to their formal position as a leader. Joke Waller-
Hunter was appointed as the first director, and lead the secretariat from 
1994-1998. JoAnne DiSano has been the secretariat director since then.24  
Of the two directors, Waller-Hunter has most often been given credit for 
her leadership. It has been emphasized that she is competent, and that she 
has been proficient in maintaining informal contact with the countries. 
However, the secretariat director is not really allowed to contact countries 
informally. DiSano has been proficient, while following the rules, and 
doing her job well according to the mandate the secretariat was given. 
Even though both directors have had a formal position as a leader, and 
Waller-Hunter has had a good reputation for leadership, it does not seem 
likely that any of the secretariat directors have actually exercised 
entrepreneurial leadership. 
One respondent pointed out the important impact by Andrey Vasiyev, 
who worked for the secretariat through the whole period 1993-2001. The 
respondent gave him credit for working with the delegates, and coming 
up with the various compromises behind the scenes; ‘he was the one who 
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knew how to work with the delegates to get the desired outcome’. Even 
though Vasiyev might have had some attributes of an entrepreneurial 
leader, it is uncertain if he actually exercised entrepreneurial leadership. 
His role as leader has not been mentioned by the other respondents, and 
thus, I will not go as far as to state that Vasiyev has acted as entrepre-
neurial leader. Still, I assume that Vasiyev’s work has been significant for 
the role of the secretariat. Summing up, I believe that there have not been 
any individuals representing the secretariat that have exercised entrepre-
neurial leadership. 
Leadership by Other Entities 
Nitin Desai has most often been mentioned as a possible entrepreneurial 
leader concerning leadership from other entities than the Bureau or the 
CSD secretariat.25 Desai had the formal position as a UN Under-
Secretary-General, and thus, was number two under the UN Secretary-
General. He headed first the DPCSD, which the secretariat was placed 
within. After the UN reorganization, when DPCSD was renamed DESA, 
Desai continued as head for DESA (Wagner 2003: 4). Even though he 
has had a formal position as a leader, there are mixed views about his 
reputation for exercising entrepreneurial leadership. According to one 
respondent, he has meant a lot for the CSD, because of his philosophical 
view. However, another respondent claims that Desai did not have the 
necessary vision, but that ‘he was better at taking someone else’s vision 
and make it happen’. He was therefore most of all a good administrator. It 
has been pointed out that Desai was an intellectual capacity for the CSD, 
and that he had a great interest for the sustainable development agenda. 
Moreover, it has been claimed that Desai also had a personal interest of 
making the CSD the main arena for sustainable development instead of 
UNEP, which was a benefit for the Commission in order to get important 
attention from the countries. Moreover, he has been given credit for hav-
ing charisma, and being able to talk to politicians and making them feel 
comfortable, which is seen as an important ability in order to be heard. 
However, it has been claimed that Desai has suppressed the CSD to a cer-
tain degree, in order to maintain control of the Commission. According to 
one respondent, Desai was removed from a lot of direct responsibilities 
concerning the CSD, when DESA was established. Thus, he had more of 
a role to play during the early years of the CSD than later. Moreover, one 
respondent thinks that Desai should have been able to do more to 
strengthen the CSD, due to his position. However, the respondent as-
sumes that it might not have been politically possible to do more because 
of the countries’ opposition. Following this, the evaluation shows that 
Nitin Desai has enjoyed some status as a leader. He has also been given 
some credit for his skills and energy. Moreover, it seems like he has 
performed some of the necessary tasks with regards to using the means of 
an entrepreneurial leader. However, I am not certain if it is reasonable to 
say that he exercised actually entrepreneurial leadership. Thus, I assume 
that he has had some significance for the CSD concerning leadership. 
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6.4 Explanatory Power 
The evaluation of ‘institutional design’ showed that; the actual role of the 
secretariat has been more active than the assistant role it was given by its 
mandate; the states’ sector representation has been narrow; and the rules 
of access for nonstate actors have been open and inclusive, and the 
participation have been broad. Concerning the CSD’s performances, my 
conclusion was that the role of the secretariat and the nonstate actors’ 
access and participation had caused the degree of the CSD’s accom-
plishments to enhance, while the states’ sector representation had caused 
the degree of the CSD’s performances to reduce. Thus, I believe that all 
of these variables can provide significant explanations for the medium 
degree of the CSD’s accomplishments. First, as the secretariat has been 
active to a certain degree in the development of negotiation texts and 
protocols, it is reasonable to believe that the CSD secretariat has affected 
the CSD’s goal of policy guidance. Moreover, it seems like the secretariat 
has had a positive impact on the CSD’s accomplishments of monitoring 
and reviewing progress on the implementation of Agenda 21, and pro-
moting dialogue and building partnerships for sustainable development. 
Second, as the states’ sector representation has been narrow, I believe that 
this has especially affected the CSD’s performances on policy guidance. 
The limited participation by other ministers than ministers with the envi-
ronmental background has lead to a one-dimensional focus on sustainable 
development. Achievements on monitoring and reviewing progress on 
the implementation of Agenda 21 may also be affected as environmental 
ministers often lack the influence needed at national level to fulfil the 
recommendations on national reporting. Third, as the rules of access for 
nonstate actors have been open and inclusive, and the participation has 
been broad, this has probably affected the CSD’s performances concern-
ing all of the main goals. Most likely, the nonstate actors have been able 
to influence the decision-making process, initiate processes, contribute 
with ideas and information, and put pressure on relevant parties. Thus, it 
is reasonable to believe that they have had an impact on the CSD’s 
achievements on monitoring and reviewing progress on the implementa-
tion of Agenda 21, and elaborating policy guidance. Moreover, it would 
be reasonable to say that they have contributed to enhanced dialogue on 
sustainable development. Following this, in my opinion ‘institutional 
design’ can provide a significant explanation for the medium degree of 
the CSD’s accomplishments. 
The evaluation of the distribution of capabilities showed that the most 
powerful states have acted as laggards. Thus, my conclusion was that 
since these powerful states have acted as laggards, they have caused the 
degree of the CSD’s accomplishments to reduce. As the most powerful 
actors have acted as laggards, I assume that this has affected the CSD’s 
accomplishments concerning all of its goals. Since the countries are in 
charge of the decision-making process, they are able to determine much 
of the output of the CSD. Most likely, the degree of the CSD’s achieve-
ments would have been lower if the output had only been affected by the 
interests of the most powerful states. Following this, in my opinion 
‘distribution of capabilities’ can provide a significant explanation the 
medium degree of the CSD’s accomplishments. 
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The review of entrepreneurial leadership showed that the CSD-1 chair 
Ismael Razali and CSD-7 chair Simon Upton have exercised entrepre-
neurial leadership. Thus, I concluded that they had caused the degree of 
the CSD’s performances to enhance. Due to their capabilities and their 
use of the means available for an entrepreneurial leader, it is reasonable 
to say that Razali and Upton have contributed to the CSD’s accomplish-
ments regarding all of its goals. I believe that they have had an impact 
especially on the work of elaborating policy guidance and promoting 
dialogue and building partnerships for sustainable development. First, 
they have both used the means of an entrepreneurial leader, in order to 
achieve results on policy guidance. Second, they have also pushed for 
greater involvement of major groups, and been innovative in finding 
ways to enhance the dialogue, and thus, had a positive impact on the 
CSD’s performances concerning the goal of promoting dialogue and 
building partnerships for sustainable development. However, it is very 
important to point out that both Razali and Upton had the formal position 
as chair for only a year, and thus, their impact were probably quite 
limited with regards to the whole period 1993-2001. As a new CSD chair 
is elected every year, there is no continuity for the chair to exercise lead-
ership. It is reasonable to believe that this will reduce the general effect 
on the CSD’s accomplishments. Moreover, even though the CSD has 
needs for leadership, the space has been quite limited. Thus, the limited 
space has probably reduced the possibilities for most individuals to act as 
entrepreneurial leaders. As the evaluation showed, entrepreneurial leader-
ship has most likely only been exercised by two of the CSD chairs. 
Following this, in my opinion ‘entrepreneurial leadership’ can only pro-
vide a significant explanation for the medium degree of the CSD’s 
accomplishments to a certain extent. 
Summing up, the evaluation of the three sets of explanatory variables 
shows that they all can more or less provide significant explanations for 
the medium degree of the CSD’s accomplishments. However, deciding 
which one of them has had the most explanatory power is a difficult mat-
ter, because the variables interact and work together concerning the 
explanation of the CSD’s accomplishments. The variables are considered 
to be complementary rather than incompatible. Thus, they can explain 
how the decision-making process is pulled in both negative and positive 
directions, which in turn explain why the degree of the performances was 
considered medium. Following this, the variables provide most likely a 
more comprehensive explanation together than if considered separately.  
6.5 Interaction Between the Explanatory Variables 
I have chosen to evaluate the independent variables separately, in order to 
gain clarity and a better understanding of how each of the variables has 
affected the CSD’s achievements. However, it is reasonable to assume 
that the negotiations and decision-making process of the CSD during the 
period of 1993-2001 has been a dynamic process, and thus, I assume 
there has been a continuous interaction between the independent vari-
ables. Therefore, I assume that the variables provide a more comprehen-
sive explanation for the medium degree of the CSD’s accomplishments 
together than if considered separately. I will here evaluate the interaction 
between the independent variables.  
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After evaluating the independent variables separately, I assume there has 
especially been continuous interaction between the secretariat, the CSD 
chair, and the countries, and that each of them have affected the other two 
concerning the impact on the achievements of the CSD. First, the CSD 
secretariat has most likely had some impact on the role of the countries 
and the chair. Chasek (2005 [interview]) notes that the secretariat does 
not like to loose control, and is therefore restrictive with regards to giving 
away control to the CSD chair or others. As pointed out earlier, the Chair 
often has to negotiate with the secretariat in order to get breakthrough for 
his ideas and proposals (Eidheim and Hofseth 2004 [interview]). As 
Eidheim and Hofseth (ibid.) experienced when working for the CSD-12 
chair Børge Brende, the Chairman’s Summary had been significantly 
edited by the secretariat.26 Furthermore, in periods when the chair has not 
been able to exercise the necessary leadership, the sessions have been 
steered quite a lot by the secretariat (ibid.). Concerning the secretariat’s 
impact on the role of the countries, the influence has been more indirect. 
As it is the secretariat’s job to develop reports, negotiation texts and 
protocols, I would assume the secretariat has had some influence on the 
countries because it has an opportunity to determine the focus of the 
sessions. Also, some of the individuals from the secretariat, such as 
Vasiyev, have acted as moderators or mediators between the countries. 
Therefore, I would assume that if a compromise is reached, individuals 
from the secretariat have been able to affect the countries’ position on the 
negotiated issue. 
Concerning the CSD chair, I would assume that the chair has affected the 
role of the secretariat and the countries, as the chair has had the formal 
leadership of the CSD. The evaluation showed that two chairs, CSD-1 
chair Ismael Razali and CSD-7 chair Simon Upton, had exercised entre-
preneurial leadership. I would expect that these two, and possibly other 
chairs, have been able to take control over the secretariat and have been 
able to steer the sessions. The review of ‘entrepreneurial leadership’ also 
showed that Razali and Upton influenced the countries’ positions, as they 
were able to work out compromises and enhance the dialogue and 
cooperation between the countries. 
Most of all, I believe that the countries have affected the role of the secre-
tariat’s and the CSD chair. The evaluation showed that the secretariat 
practised self-censorship, as it has the experience of knowing which ideas 
and proposals that will be accepted by the countries. Moreover, I assume 
it has been difficult for the chair to exercise leadership in negotiations on 
issues where the states have strong interests, such as the issue of financial 
resources. Most importantly, as the countries are in charge of the 
decision-making process, they are able to make decisions that might have 
a great impact on the role of the secretariat and the role of the chair.  
This evaluation shows that there has been a continuous interaction be-
tween the secretariat, the chair and the countries, but also that there has 
been a certain alternation as to which actors have influenced the CSD 
process. This explanation is supplemented by the explanatory power of 
the variables of ‘the states’ sector representation’ and ‘nonstate actors’ 
access and participation’. As the states’ sector representation remained 
narrow more or less through the whole period 1993-2001, this has had a 
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continuous negative effect on the CSD’s accomplishments. Also, as the 
nonstate actors’ rules of access have been open and inclusive, and the 
participation has been broad more or less through the whole period 1993-
2001, this has had a continuous positive effect on the CSD’s accomplish-
ments. My conclusion here is that these variables complement each other 
with regards to the explanation of the CSD, and thus, in my opinion the 
variables together provide a more significant explanation of the medium 
degree of the CSD’s accomplishments than the variables provide separ-
ately. However, even though the variables complement each other, I 
assume that ‘distribution of capabilities’ has the highest explanatory 
power of the three variables as the countries actually are in charge of the 
decision-making process.  
7. Conclusion 
My main purpose for this study has been to determine and explain the 
degree of the CSD’s accomplishments during the CSD’s first ten years, in 
order to indicate its potential for effectiveness. Two theoretical perspec-
tives, ‘character of the problem’ and ‘problem-solving capacity’ were 
introduced to study the performances of the CSD. As a point of departure, 
I considered the problem of sustainable development to be politically and 
intellectually malign, and thus, the CSD had a difficult starting point for 
goal attainment. The first part of my analysis was concentrated on eval-
uating and determining the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments. The 
second part was based on the ‘problem-solving capacity’ perspective, in 
which I used three sets of explanatory variables, in order to evaluate and 
determine which mechanisms explain the degree of the performances of 
the CSD. I will here sum up my main findings of the analysis, before the 
fruitfulness of the study will be commented. Finally, I will look at the 
future prospects for the CSD.  
7.1 Main Findings of the Analysis 
The first part of my analysis concerned answering the first question of my 
thesis, ‘to what degree has CSD achieved its goals?’ In order to determine 
the score of my dependent variable, I evaluated the decision-making 
process of the CSD during the period 1993-2001. The Commission’s 
achievements were examined with regards to the three major goals of its 
mission, as set out by Resolution 47/191. As elaborated on in Chapter 5, a 
final judgement of the performances of the CSD was; medium score on 
reviewing and monitoring progress on the implementation of Agenda 21, 
low score on elaborating policy guidance and options for future 
initiatives, and high score on promoting dialogue and partnerships for 
sustainable development between governments, the international com-
munity, and major groups. Overall, the degree of the CSD’s accomplish-
ments was considered to be medium.  
The question of ‘which mechanisms explain the CSD’s accomplish-
ments?’ was to be answered in the second part of my analysis. First, three 
institutional factors of institutional design, ‘the role of the secretariat’, 
‘the states’ sector representation’ and ‘nonstate actors access and partici-
pation’, was examined with regards to the assumptions proposed in Chap-
ter 2. The evaluation showed that the actual role of the secretariat had 
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been more active than the assistant role it was given by its mandate; the 
states’ sector representation had been narrow; and the rules of access for 
nonstate actors had been open and inclusive, and the participation had 
been broad. Thus, the role of the secretariat and the nonstate actors’ 
access and participation had caused the degree of the CSD’s perform-
ances to enhance, while the states’ sector representation had caused the 
degree of the CSD’s accomplishments to reduce. Second, I reviewed the 
‘distribution of capabilities’, in which I concluded that as the most 
powerful states had acted as laggards, they had caused the achievements 
of the CSD to reduce. Third, the evaluation of ‘entrepreneurial leader-
ship’ showed that limited space had probably reduced the possibilities for 
most individuals to act as entrepreneurial leaders. Thus, only two of the 
CSD chairs had exercised entrepreneurial leadership, in which I conclud-
ed that they had most likely enhanced the CSD’s performance, but within 
a limited time period.  
Summing up, I concluded that all of the independent variables provided 
significant explanations of the medium degree of the CSD’s accomplish-
ments to a certain extent. Some of the variables explained how the 
decision-making process was pulled in a negative direction, and some of 
the variables showed how the process was pulled in a positive direction. 
Thus, I assumed that these variables complemented each other regarding 
the explanation of the medium degree of the CSD’s accomplishments. 
Following this, I concluded that the independent variables together pro-
vided a more significant explanation than the variables provided separ-
ately.  
7.2 The Fruitfulness of the Study 
My intention here is to make some comments about the fruitfulness of the 
perspectives of the ‘character of the problem’ and ‘problem-solving capa-
city’. As a point of departure, I think these perspectives provide some 
interesting insights in regard to the achievements of the CSD.  
As the perspectives of the ‘character of the problem’ and the ‘problem-
solving capacity’ is seen as mutually independent, I defined the character 
of the problem prior to the analysis, in order to understand the CSD’s 
potential for goal attainment. However, I assumed that the ‘problem-
solving capacity’ perspective could provide some significant explana-
tions, in order to understand how it would be possible to enhance the 
CSD’s potential for effectiveness. Thus, I used the ‘problem-solving 
capacity’ perspective to explain and determine which mechanisms that 
affects the degree of the CSD’s accomplishments. As the negotiations and 
the decision-making process of the CSD can be seen as a dynamic pro-
cess, it is reasonable to assume that there are mechanisms that affect each 
other, but also pull the process in different directions. Thus, ‘the role of 
the secretariat’ and ‘entrepreneurial leadership’ were useful for under-
standing some of positive driving-forces within the CSD. It has also been 
important to evaluate the significance of ‘nonstate actors’ access and 
participation’ as the participation of NGOs and other major groups has 
been highlighted as one of the major positive attributes of the CSD. 
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On the other hand, the limited participation by ministers other than those 
with environmental background has been a continuous problem for the 
CSD concerning the integration of the environmental, social and econom-
ic dimensions of sustainable development. Hence, ‘states’ sector repre-
sentation’ provided a valuable supplement to the other explanatory varia-
bles. Most important, the evaluation of ‘distribution of capabilities’ and 
states’ interests and positions was significant in order to understand 
which mechanisms that pulled the process in a negative direction. Since 
the states are in charge of the decision-making process, they are also able 
to decide the success or failure of the CSD to a certain extent. An institu-
tion is only as strong as the member states want it to be. However, as the 
most powerful actors acted as laggard, this affected both the positive 
impact of the secretariat and the chairs, and, most importantly, the CSD’s 
potential for effectiveness. First of all, the states gave the CSD a low-
level placement within the UN hierarchy. The consequence was that the 
CSD has no operational arm to enact its decisions, and it does not have 
the final word on its decisions (Wagner 2003: 4). Moreover, the states 
decided that the reporting process would be voluntary. Thus, the CSD 
does not have any enforcement mechanisms to hold the governments 
accountable and to put pressure on the countries in order to improve the 
national implementation. This is an important point to stress as the CSD’s 
capacity to function efficiently depends heavily on how the truthful gov-
ernments are about the actual implementation of the Agenda 21 (Maier 
2000 in Agarwal et al. 2001: 216).  
The ‘distribution of capabilities’ has also been useful to understand the 
effect of the North-South conflict, since this conflict has hampered the 
decision-making process and often lead to ‘lowest common denominator’ 
agreements. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the CSD’s accomplish-
ments will not enhance significantly until the countries break out of the 
North-South schism. However, this approach has some limits concerning 
the coalition size influence of the Southern countries. Most likely, the 
Southern countries only have this kind of influence within fora such the 
UN, due to a widespread use of the consensus rule.  
Even though the perspectives of the ‘character of the problem’ and the 
‘problem-solving capacity’ provide some significant explanations, some 
limitations can be noted. As pointed out in Chapter 2, CSD is linked to 
other UN bodies and other international organizations in its work on 
sustainable development. Therefore, international processes and efforts 
by international organizations may have an effect on the accomplish-
ments of CSD. This regards especially the CSD’s relationship with 
UNEP, as there has been a concern about the overlapping and duplicative 
functions of the CSD and UNEP. The concepts of ‘regime linkage 
(Young 1996) and ‘regime interplay’ (Stokke 2000) may have been rele-
vant to include, in order to understand the impact of these effects. More-
over, I believe that domestic politics have affected the states’ interests 
and positions at international level. Thus, I assume that such an approach 
could have been useful in order to understand the position of the most 
powerful actors and the importance of political will at national level to 
move the process forward. Also, ‘domestic politics’ could have provided 
a more comprehensive explanation of the narrow states’ sector represen-
tation. As noted by Chasek (2002: 7), national governments are sectoral 
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or compartmentalized by nature, and thus, the lack of coordination 
between the different ministries at the national level, is most likely 
reflected at the international level. 
Finally, I believe that my approach to the study of the CSD has some 
limitations regarding its positive effects. As the CSD’s accomplishments 
have been evaluated compared to its mandate, I have not included the 
more widespread consequences of the CSD. Eidheim and Hofseth (2004 
[interview]) noted that it is the things that happen outside the formal 
framework which is really important. First of all, the CSD has motivated 
numerous government-sponsored meetings and workshops related to the 
implementation of Agenda 21. Moreover, its lack of decision-making 
capacity may have allowed more open dialogue and greater flexibility in 
involving civil society organizations. The CSD has also fostered coordin-
ation on sustainable development within the UN system and galvanized 
NGO and major group activities and action aimed at sustainable develop-
ment at the international, national, and local levels. Most important, the 
Commission has attracted ministers and major group to exchange ideas 
and information, and to share experiences and technology, and thus, been 
an important meeting place for the actors involved in the work of 
sustainable development (Chasek 2000: 393; IIED 2001: 8 in Wagner 
2003: 4). Following this, even though the achievements seem modest if 
the CSD is evaluated compared to its mandate, in my opinion the CSD 
has been significant for advancing the sustainable development agenda. 
Summing up, it is reasonable to say that the perspectives of the ‘character 
of the problem’ and the ‘problem-solving capacity’ is useful for under-
standing the significance of an institution such as the CSD. These 
perspectives also provide explanations of what might affect an institu-
tion’s potential for effectiveness. Furthermore, they may be useful con-
cerning information about how to improve the institution’s potential for 
effectiveness. However, some limitations are noted, in which the lack of 
insights from ‘domestic politics’ is the most important. 
7.3 Future Prospects for the CSD 
The study of the CSD has shown that it has made a positive contribution 
to the work on sustainable development. However, some improvements 
are needed if it is truly going to be the institution for advancing the 
sustainable development agenda many hoped it would be. First of all, the 
CSD needs a more focused agenda. Thus, it should address a few priority 
global issue areas where no other forum has any responsibility, such as 
freshwater. Second, the Commission needs mechanisms to avoid further 
conflict between the Northern and Southern countries. As this is a 
longstanding conflict, it will not be an easy matter to solve. One sugges-
tion is additional funding to support increased representation from 
national capitals of the developing countries, in order to limit the partici-
pation of UN diplomats at the sessions. Third, and most important, the 
implementation process needs to be strengthened. Therefore, the CSD 
should focus on capacity-building and technological improvements at 
national and local levels. Moreover, the national reporting should be 
improved. As suggested by Maier (2000 in Agarwal et al. 2001: 216), the 
current format of the national reporting system should be changed, ‘from 
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the one currently conducted by governments, to one where the assess-
ments are carried out independently and freely by qualified institutions’. 
Overall, political will needs to be mobilized at international, national and 
local levels, in order for the CSD to advance the sustainable development 
agenda. 
These are only a few suggestions of how the CSD can be truly successful. 
As the CSD is still a young institution, only time will tell how it will 
develop in the years to come. Since I have only evaluated the achieve-
ments of the Commission during the period 1993-2001, the changes made 
at WSSD in 2002 have not been discussed here.27  
 
Notes 
1
 The concept of ‘regime’ has often been criticized because of the lack of pre-
cision and vagueness. Also, the so-called consensus definition first proposed by 
Krasner is still contested by many scholars. For further discussion of the concept, 
see Levy et al. (1995: 270ff) and Hasenclever et al. (1997: 186ff). 
2
 See for instance Waltz (1979) and Keohane (1984) 
3
 This definition of effectiveness is not sufficiently precise to be useful as an 
analytical tool for systematic empirical reseach, but since my main objective in 
this thesis will not be effectiveness in such, I have chosen to use this definition 
without further clarification. 
4
 ‘Impact’ will also refer to the set of consequences flowing from the implemen-
tation of and adjustment to a regime or an institution (Underdal 1992: 230). 
5
 Effectiveness can be specified by drawing a distinction between implementa-
tion, where consequences are in the form of changes in human behavior, i.e. 
outcome, and the consequences that materialize as changes in the state of the 
biophysical environment itself, i.e. impact (Underdal 2002: 248). As studies of 
impact are seen as extremely difficult because of methodological problems, most 
work has been concerned of outcome. Therefore, effectiveness will here be 
understood as consequences in the form of outcome. 
6
 As identified in Agenda 21, the major groups are: women, youth and children, 
indigenous people, nongovernmental organizations, local authorities, workers 
and trade unions, business and industry, scientific and technological communi-
ties, and farmers (Agarwal et al. 2001: 196). 
7
 These terms are most often used in relations to more issue-specific interests, 
where it is possible to predict an actor’s position by evaluating the actor’s costs 
and benefits (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994). However, since the CSD is not 
restricted to a specific issue-area, but is rather directed towards a large number of 
issues, these terms will be used more generally. 
8
 The IACSD became the Inter-Agency Meeting on Sustainable Development in 
2000 (Wagner 2003: 5). 
9
 A UN reorganization changed the name of DPCSD to the Departement of 
Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) (Wagner 2003: 5). 
10
 ACC was renamed the Chief Executive Board (CEB) for Coordination in 2000 
(Wagner 2003: 5). 
11
 The members of IACSD are the Food and Agriculture Organization, UN 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, World Health Organization, 
World Meterological Organization, World Bank, UN Development Programme, 
UN Environment Programme, the International Labour Organization and Inter-
national Agency for Atomic Energy. 
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12
 It is important to note that also UNGASS, the five-year evaluation of the CSD, 
will be included in the presentation because of its relevance to the decision-
making process. 
13
 1992-1997 figures from DPCSD table from Yamin 1998/99. 1998-2002 fig-
ures from DPCSD table (on file with author). 
14
 Notes 1-4 are from Yamin 1998/99: 58. 
15
 Sources on national reports 1992-97 are from Yamin 1998/99: 58. 
16
 It is important to point out that ‘partnerships’ is here used as a general term, 
and not as the concept of ‘Type II partnerships’ which was introduced at WSSD, 
and concerns voluntary agreements entered into by private and public sector 
entities (Wagner 2003: 17). 
17
 The total number of respondents was 7. 
18
 DESA (Departement of Economic and Social Affairs) is the new name of the 
former Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development 
(DPCSD) (see 3.2.2). 
19
 The EU was expanded from 12 to 15 member states in 1995, and from 15 to 25 
states in 2004. 
20
 Only four countries have achieved the 0.7 % of GNP target for ODA: Norway, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden (Agarwal et al. 2001: 221). 
21
 The US has never accepted the UN target of 0.7 % of GNP for ODA (Brown 
1998: 4) 
22
 When not specified, the information is based on interviews with Chasek 
[2005]; Leiro [2004], Schei [2004] and Zhu and Moita-Lou [2005].  
23
 Ismael Razali chaired the working group on legal and institutional issues at 
UNCED’s PrepCom IV, when the idea of a sustainable development commission 
was first introduced. He was also approved as chair for the Institutions contact 
group, which addressed the role, functions and reporting structure of the Sustain-
able Development Commission at UNCED. Moreover, he chaired a special 
open-ended ad hoc working group of the Second Committee of UNGA, that 
worked out the modalities of the CSD for UNGA-47 (ENB 1992a; ENB 1992c).  
24
 The information is based on interviews with Chasek [2005]; Eidheim and 
Hofseth [2004]; Eidheim and Hofseth [2005]; and Schei [2004]. 
25
 When not specified, the information is based on interviews with Chasek 
[2005]; Eidheim and Hofseth [2005]; Schei [2004]; and Zhu and Morita-Lou 
[2005]. 
26
 ‘The Chairman’s Summery’ is the CSD chair’s own summary of the session, 
which is one of the documents adopted by the Commission. 
27
 The ten-year review of the CSD. 
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